RAMAN PILLAY Vs. DAKSHAYANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short point involved in these petitions is whether this Court should invoke its revisional jurisdiction for examining the correctness, legality or propriety of the order of acquittal in a case at the instance of the de facto complainant. This Court in the decision in Abraham v. Thankamma ( 1975 KLT 451 ) held that revision petitions arising from matters pending in courts subordinate to the Sessions Judge should at the first instance be filed before the Sessions Judge. The petitions which came up in Abraham v. Thankamma (1975 KLT 451) did not relate to acquittal. The present petitions were referred to a Division Bench since it was contended before the Single Judge that a revision against the order of acquittal stands on a different footing and as it was urged that S.402 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure has not been adverted to in the above decision. Before considering these aspects, it may not be out of place to refer generally to the relevant provisions of the old Code of Criminal procedure and some of the changes effected in the new Code.

(2.) Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, powers of revision were conferred on the High Court, Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate under S.435 and 436. Under S.435(4), if any application had been made either to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate, no further application was entertainable by the other of them. S.436 related to cases where effective orders could be made by the Sessions Judge. In cases where the Sessions Judge was not competent to make effective orders, he was to send a report to the High Court under S.438 and the High Court would pass appropriate orders under S.439. A practice had been followed by almost every High Court that wherever there was concurrent revisional jurisdiction conferred on Courts of different grades, the aggrieved party should approach the interior among such Courts first and not the High Court directly. This practice was being followed in matters falling under S.436. It is referred to in the decisions in Das Isaac v. Narayanan ( 1958 KLT 1110 ) and Mohammed Bashir v. Itty ( 1963 KLT 932 ). In Devaki v. Kitta ( 1967 KLT 31 ) a Division Bench of this Court extended the above principle to all cases under S.435 and 439 and held that as a salutary practice, the High Court would not entertain a revision petition unless the aggrieved party approached the inferior court first. The matter was considered by a Full Bench in Narayanan v. Kannamma Bhargavi ( 1968 KLT 495 ). The Full Bench disposed of the issue with the following observations:

(3.) The new Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 1974) effected some changes in the revisional jurisdiction. No powers of revision are conferred on the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In other respects, S.397(1) corresponds to S.435(1) and S.398 corresponds to S.436. S.397(3) is worded on similar lines as S.435(4) but with the difference that the High Court and the Sessions Judge are substituted in the places of Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate. A bar is also imposed in the exercise of revisional powers in relation to interlocutory orders. S.399 and 401 deal with the powers of revision of the Sessions Judge and the High Court. It is evident that the restrictions that existed under the old Code on the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge have been taken away and the Sessions Judge is competent to exercise all or any of the powers that may be exercised by the High Court under S.401. S.399(3), however, states that when any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court.