LAWS(KER)-1975-10-14

JONEY Vs. DIRECTOR OF TELEGRAPHS

Decided On October 23, 1975
JONEY Appellant
V/S
DIRECTOR OF TELEGRAPHS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I regret, I have to dispose of this case without the assistance of a counter-affidavit and the relevant files. It cannot be that more than 2 years is not sufficient for the respondents to instruct their counsel.

(2.) THE short question for decision in this case is whether the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle, Trivandrum was competent to review an order of the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Kottayam censuring the petitioner under R. 29 (1) (v) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in brief, the rules ). THE order Ext. P6 passed by the Director of Telegraphs, Kerala Circle, Trivandrum so reviewing the order of the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs and imposing a punishment of barring, for a period of 2 years, one increment of the petitioner who was an Engineering supervisor was confirmed in appeal by the Postmaster General, Kerala Circle, trivandrum. Ext. P8 is the copy of that order. THEre is a time limit prescribed by R. 29 (1) of the Rules, for action by way of review suo mote by an appellate authority. Sub rule (v) of R. 29 (1) provides that the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed may at any time either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under the rules or under the rules repealed by R. 34 from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed. It is further provided that in the process of reviewing such order the appellate authority may confirm, modify or set aside the order or confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed or remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case or the appellate authority may pass such other order as it may deem fit. Where the appellate authority in making the review imposes or enhances the penalty that can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person affected to meet the case. THE rule therefore indicates that such review can be only within a period of 6 months from the date of the order proposed to be reviewed. THE order of the Divisional Engineer telegraphs, Kottayam, Ext. P3, which was reviewed by Ext. P6 order was passed on 28 71970. THE order of review is dated 16 31972, evidently after more than 6 months from the date of the order reviewed.

(3.) MY attention has been invited to a decision of the high Court of Andhra Pradesh in Shoukata Khan v. Director of Postal Services, (1972 (7) S. L. R. 875 ). That was a case where in exercise of the power under r. 29 (1) of the Rules the appellate authority called for the records within a period of 6 months but initiated action by issue of notice to the petitioner beyond the period of 6 months. It is true that in that case the learned judges took the view that the relevant date would be the date when notice was issued to the petitioner and not the date when records were called for. With great respect to the learned Judges, I see no warrant for such an approach to the rule which makes plain reading. If the date of review need not be within 6 months I see no reason why it should be held that the relevant date is not the date for calling for records, but some other subsequent date, namely, initiating proceedings for review. In fact the rule does not, either expressly or impliedly, indicate that the date of initiation of the proceedings is relevant in the matter of fixing the time. It is true that the learned judges have observed in the judgment that when ones the proceedings are commenced within the time limited for the purpose by law the authority concerned could take any time that is reasonably necessary for completing the review proceedings. It would appear that this position was conceded by the petitioner's counsel in that case. I have my own reservations on this question, but it is not necessary to express my views on this here.