(1.) We are satisfied that the learned Judge exceeded the limits for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution in interfering with the revisional order passed by the Government and evidenced by Ext. P3. The 1st respondent who was the petitioner who filed the writ petition which was allowed by the learned judge, was an applicant for grant of a licence or authority in respect of a ration shop No. ARD 141, Vaikom Taluk. The appellant before us was another applicant for the said licence or authority. The choice ultimately resolved itself to one between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant strongly urged that the 1st respondent was disentitled to the grant of licence as he had been guilty of impersonation, had been convicted by a criminal court, and that, on a prior occasion a licence granted to him had been cancelled on account of its irregularities or misconduct. These were considered in detail by Ext. P1 order of the District Supply Officer the first authority, who held that none of these grounds had been established or proved. He accordingly chose the first respondent as the fittest person to conduct the ration shop. Ext. P1 is a copy of his order. The appellant filed an appeal before the District Collector. The objections were repeated before him In an order evidenced by Ext. P2, the Collector affirmed the order of the District Supply Officer holding that the allegations of misconduct or criminal conviction made against the 1st respondent had not been proved. The appellant took up the matter further in revision before the Government. The Government observed:
(2.) We are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge in regard to the scope of the revisional power of the Government. The revisional power has been conferred by Clause.45 (II) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966, which reads as follows:
(3.) But the point that Was keenly debated before us was whether the revisional authority had perforce to be satisfied about the impropriety of the order on the records before the first authority, or whether it was open to it to feel so satisfied on the strength of the records produced before it at the revisional stage or on the strength of the materials brought to light before it at the revisional stage, in the light of which it felt further enquiry and reexamination was necessary. We feel that this matter has been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in favour of the appellant. We refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheria Abdullah case ( AIR 1965 SC 1585 ). The Court was there concerned with the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax by S.12(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act read with R.14A of the Rules framed thereunder. The Section confers revisional power almost in similar if not identical terms as Clause.45(11) of the Rationing Order. With respect to the Section and the Rule it was observed by the Supreme Court.