(1.) THE same question has been referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66 in relation to the same assessee. THE question referred is in these terms:
(2.) THE returns for the two years 1964-65 and 1965-66 should have been filed by the assessee on or before June 30, 1964, and June 30, 1965, respectively. Admittedly, this had not been done. THE returns for the two years were filed only on March 30, 1970.
(3.) A glance at the sections is sufficient for the purpose of understanding that the penalty that could have been imposed under the section as it stood originally is different from the penalty that can be imposed after it was amended. Before the amendments all that had been provided was the maximum limit of the penalty that could be imposed. The penalty was not geared statutorily to the time lag between the due date of the return and the actual date of filing the return, though in the exercise of discretion by the authorities empowered to act under the section, the time lag may be a matter which could have been taken into account for determining the quantum of the penalty. Even after the amendment, in a sense, the discretion has been taken away or at least drastically curtailed in that the statute itself provided that for every month of continued default there should be a penalty and what should be the quantum of that penalty has also been provided by the section itself. But the most significant change that has been introduced, it appears to us, is about the nature of the offence itself. An omission which had been made a penal offence under the Act as it originally stood before the amendments, and which offence was complete on the expiry of the due date, has been after the amendment made into a continuing offence, an offence that repeated itself every month. Whether an act or omission is an offence or not should be determined with reference to the state of affairs that obtained at the time of the commission of the act or at the time the omission took place. This had been succinctly stated by Sir Lionel Leach, Chief Justice of Madras, in the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah [1943] 11 ITR 308 (Mad) and in Full Bench decision of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Ahamed [1974] 95 ITR 599 (Ker) [FB] we stated the same principle and also referred to the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah [1943] 11 ITR 308 (Mad) with approval. So, the normal rule is that an amendment which took effect subsequent to an act or omission should not be applied for punishing or penalising the person who committed the act or was guilty of the omission.