(1.) THE petitioner in O. P. 674 of 1958 is the karnavan of a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad and the petitioner in O. P. 684 of 1959 was the karnavan of a Namboodiri Illom, and they seek to quash the assessments of their families under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In doing so, they have challenged inter alia the constitutionality of the Act, as having; been passed by Parliament without the requisite legislative power under Entry 86 of List I of the seventh schedule and in particular, the validity of the charging Section, Section. 3, as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. THE former contention was repelled and the latter was accepted, by the judgment delivered by a division bench of this Court on the 21st July, 1961. On appeals preferred against that judgment by the Revenue, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and remanded these and the-other petitions which were all heard together. Of the two contentions formulated above, the first relating to the constitutionality of the Act in relation to Entry 86 was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in Banarasi Pass v. Wealth Tax Officer, AIR 1965 SC 1387, and only the second remained open to the petitioners and was pressed before us, not to mention the point taken in O. P. 684 of 1959 against the merits or the propriety of the order of' assessment.
(2.) AS directed by the Supreme Court, an opportunity was given to the petitioners and to the department to file fresh affidavits. Section 3 of the Wealth Tax Act which is impugned as discriminatory, is in these terms:
(3.) THE use of the term "Hindu undivided family" in antithesis with "individual" was not, as the argument of counsel for the Revenue implied, to distinguish and separate undivided families on the basis of religion into those of Hindus and of non-Hindus, but was to distinguish an agglomeralion or a group of individuals formed or associated hy agreement or contract or otherwise between the parties, from a group in which the members take their interest by birth and are welded together into a unit by the personal law which binds them. THE former pertains to the region of contract and the latter pertains to the region of status. This distinction receives considerable support from the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in Abhav L. Khatau v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, 1965 57 ITR 202 in which the question was, whether joint trustees can be taxed under the Act in respect of the value of the properties held by them as trustees in the status of "individual". THEy could not be taxed as "an association of persons", which is not a unit of assessment in the Act. While overruling the contention that even as a group, a body of trustees could not be held to be included in Ihe term "individual" when that term is used in juxtaposition with Hindu undivided family, the Court observed as follows, after dealing with the peculiar features of a Hindu undivided family :