CHACKO SCARIA Vs. RTA ALLEPPY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The second respondent applied for a temporary permit on the route Changanacherry - Ponthapuzha, a distance of 25 miles. The application was granted by the Regional Transport Authority by its order dated 13-9-1965 (Ext. P-2). The petitioner challenges the validity of this order mainly on three grounds: (1) that the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary permit as applications for pucca permit to operate in the route were pending on the date when the grant was made, (2) that the order of the Regional Transport Authority does not indicate the reasons which prompted the grant, and (3) that the permit was issued within one month of Ext. P-2 order and that was ia violation of the provisions of R.177(2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules.

(2.) As regards the first point it was urged by counsel for the petitioner that on 1-9-1965 one P. P. Philip had applied for a pucca permit, evidenced by Ext. R-7, in the route and therefore under the first proviso to S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant the permit. But it is not clear that the application was for a permit in the route. The Regional Transport Authority had stated that the route covered by the application of P. P. Phillip is not the same as that covered by the grant to the second respondent. Therefore there is no substance in this contention of the petitioner.

(3.) It was argued for the petitioner that applications for pucca permit in the route were made on 6-9-1965 and 13-9-1965 in pursuance to the invitation by the Regional Transport Authority for applications for a pucca permit in the identical route and that the pendency of these applications was a bar to the grant of temporary permit under the first proviso to S.62. It may be recalled at this moment that the Regional Transport Authority heard the parties on 3-9-1965 and adjourned the case to 13-9-1965 for further discussion and decision. Ext. P-2 order was passed on 13-9-1965. The argument of Mr. Neelacanta Menon, appearing for the second respondent was that although the decision bears the date 13-9-1965 the parties were really heard on 3-9-1965 and the decision was taken on that date, but that the formal order alone was drawn up on 13-9-1965. He submitted that the order passed on 13-9-1965 has retrospective effect and should be considered as having been really passed on 3-9-1965. In support of this he referred me to the following passage in Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edition, page 73: