(1.) In quasi-criminal matters, ignorance of fact or lack of personal knowledge may be an immaterial defence. The proposition of the law in this regard is clear and followed at least from 1884 onwards, see opinion of the Queen's Bench in Cundy v. Le Cocq [(1884) 13 QBD 207], which we quote here:
(2.) When the law and its enforcers fail to distinguish between the wicked and the blameless, justice becomes elusive, and the Court may inadvertently become complicit in the injustice. Though it is often difficult to adjudge each case in light of its unique facts and circumstances, the Court must nevertheless strive to adopt an approach that advances the ends of justice. In doing so, it may become necessary to invoke principles of fairness while interpreting a statute that accords some latitude for discretion-particularly where the impugned act is attributable to the will or choice of another. This would be impossible if statutory provisions did not provide for such discretion.
(3.) In the present case, we are examining an order directing the confiscation of an excavator allegedly used for reclaiming paddy land. We are in full agreement with the concerns expressed by the District Collector as well as with the submissions of the learned Government Pleader. Any act of conversion or reclamation of paddy land must indeed be viewed with utmost seriousness. At the same time, we cannot overlook the position of the owner of the JCB excavator, valued at Rs.32,25,000.00, who appears to have been induced to undertake the work by the landowner. Nowhere in the proceedings is there any finding that the excavator owner, Mr. Venugopalan C., knew that the land was classified as paddy in the revenue records or the Data Bank.