STATE OF KERALA Vs. VEERAMANI IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We do not think that there is any scope for interference in this appeal. The 3rd respondent in the Original Petition (who is the 2nd respondent in the writ appeal) was the President of the Travancore Devaswom Board, whose tenure of office in terms of S.10 (1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, expired on 30-11-1983. Thereafter, he wrote a letter of resignation dated December 10, 1983 informing the Governor that he was tendering his resignation of the Membership of the Board under sub-s.(2) of S.10 of the Act; and that resignation was to take effect from 16-12-1983; unless his successor was appointed before that date. In the letter, he also pointed out that his term of office had already expired on 30-11-1983, but he was continuing to hold the office of the President only by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-s.(3) of S.10 of the Act. Sub-s.(3) of S.10 of the Act provides:

(2.) It could not also be contended that by the letter dated 21-12-1983 sent by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Department, a new appointment has been effected as once he ceased to be a Member of the Board he could not be appointed to be a Member without following the procedure prescribed for the constitution of the Board. The appellants have no case that it is following the procedure prescribed for the nomination of the Member of the Board that the letter dated 21-12-1983 was sent by the 2nd appellant.

(3.) The Advocate General, who moved the appeal for admission, submitted that in the absence of acceptance of resignation by the Governor, of the letter of resignation sent by the 3rd respondent, the resignation of the 3rd respondent did not come into effect. In support of his contention, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra f AIR 1978 SC 694 ). That was a case in which a High Court Judge, Satish Chandra by name, sent in his resignation intimating the President that his resignation would take effect from a particular date, before which date he withdrew the resignation. Repelling the contention that the resignation had taken effect the moment the letter of resignation was sent by the Judge, the Supreme Court held that the Judge had the option to withdraw the resignation before the effective date mentioned in the letter. The Supreme Court observed in Para.51 as follows: