VARGHESE Vs. K T A MALAPPURAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS original petition has been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash Ext. P13 judgment of the second respondent, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam. Petitioner holds a regular permit for the route Puduponnani-Guruvayur in respect of vehicle KRR 1031. Edappal is said to be an important place two kilometres away from the route. Petitioner gave Ext. P1 application for variation of the route so as to touch Edappal that is, two single trips on the original route and four single trips on the varied route under S. 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short'the Act') and R. 212 of the Motor Vehicles Rules (for short'the Rules' ). He also applied for a temporary permit on the varied route. First respondent, r. T. A, Malappuram took up both the applications and directed the application for variation of the route to be notified under S. 57 (3) of the Act and rejected the application for temporary permit. The matter was duly notified. It is said that no representations were received against the proposal. The R T. A. in due course considered the application but rejected it under Ext P3 order. Petitioner herein filed revision petition No. 163/1983 before the second respondent who allowed the same and remanded the matter for fresh consideration under Ext. P4 judgment. When the R. T. A. met again to re-consider the same, petitioner's application was opposed by the third respondent but variation was granted under Ext P5 order. Timings were also revised under Ext. P6. Third respondent filed a revision petition challenging Ext P5 order before the second respondent. Petitioner herein opposed the revision petition on the ground of the same being barred by limitation and also on merits. The Tribunal went into both the questions and allowed the revision and remanded the matter once again for fresh consideration. On the question of limitation, the Tribunal observed that the revision petition was not filed within 30 days of the date of the order but this technicality should not stand in the way of substantial justice being rendered by the Tribunal and since the order of the RTA. was manifestly illegal, it has to be interfered with.

(2.) THE main contention of the petitioner is that revision petition filed by the third respondent before the Tribunal was actually barred by limitation and since there was no application or request to condone the delay, the Tribunal could not ignore the bar and allow the revision. Learned counsel for the third respondent contended that as a matter of fact, there was no bar of limitation. According to the third respondent, he was not present when the RTA. took the decision. Nor was the decision conveyed to him. Though the limitation prescribed is 30 days from the date of the order, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the starting point of the limitation must be from the date on which third respondent came to know the order or a copy of the order was received by him. If this be the starting point, there is no dispute that the revision was in time.

(3.) I may also refer to another decision of the Supreme court in Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan and others (AIR. 1965 SC. 458 ). In that case, the RTA. passed a resolution proposing the shifting of a bus stand in 1959. The relevant notification was published only in 1960. It was challenged in revision long after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the decision but within 30 days of the notification. Question arose when exactly time started to run for the purpose of revision. The Court observed that in interpreting the provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide. The Court also took the view that "from the date of the order" in S. 64a of the Act should not be read as "date of knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear indication to that effect. That is because in certain other provisions of the Act (Ss. 13,15, 16, 21e, 21f and 35) time limit has been prescribed from the date of knowledge of the order. Therefore, strict construction was to be followed. The Supreme Court proceeded to consider the exact meaning of the phrase "the date of the order. " there was no order as such but only a resolution which under R. 134 of the Rules was required to be notified publicly. It is only by such notification that a notified bus stand comes into existence and so long as the notification is not made, in law there was no effective fixation of a new bus stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand. There could be no real grievance as long as notification has not been made. In this view, it was held that the date of notification is the date on which the order is finally made. I have also been referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Boota Mal v. Union of India (AIR. 1962 SC. 1716) where with reference to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act it has been observed that equitable considerations are out of place and strict grammatical meaning of words has to be adopted.