NARAYANA MENON Vs. DEVASSY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question in these revision petitions is whether in the computation of time for presentation of an insolvency petition the period when Court remains closed is excluded. In Chenchuramana Reddi v. Arunachalam ( AIR 1935 Mad. 857 F.B.) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held such period not to be excluded. A contrary view was taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande (AIR 1942 All. 429) and by a Full Bench of the Travancore Cochin High Court in Gopala Pillai v. Sankara Iyer ( 1954 KLT 535 ).

(2.) S.9(1)(c) of the Cochin Insolvency Act, under which this case has arisen, is identical in expression with S.9(1)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. In fact the latter Act was the precedent that the Cochin Act followed closely.

(3.) The wording of the Section may tempt a construction that requires the computation of time backward from the date of presentation of the petition to the date of occurrence of the act of insolvency to see if it exceeds three months, as has been held in the Madras case cited above. But, the General Clauses Act provides the principle of construction of statutory computation of time, and whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it applies: Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar ( AIR 1961 SC 838 , 843) That principle is in S.10 of the Act and is thus: