MADHAVAN Vs. THE ORIENT UNION BANK LTD.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A debtor to a bank is the writ applicant. His contention, briefly put, and as stated by his counsel, is that the exemption provided in Clause (xi) of sub -section (c) of Section 2 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 will not apply to his liability to the bank, the respondent. Clause (xi) and the proviso thereto of Section 2(c) are in these terms:

(2.) THE petitioner was allowed to operate an overdraft account with the respondent, a bank. He executed a security bond for the sum of Rs. 2,000/ -. This was in the year 1947. There was another bond, two years later, in 1949, for an identical amount. In 1953, there was a third bond for a sum of Rs. 3,000/ -. Amounts were advanced on the basis of the overdraft agreements. Time for repayment of the loans was also fixed in the respective bonds. In 1955, there was yet another bond and this was for the sum of Rs. 4,500/ -. It is said therein that the amount outstanding due in 1954 was the sum of Rs. 1,875.4 annas and that the balance of Rs. 2,624.12 annas was borrowed on that date. Apparently, the amount represented by this 4th bond remained due at the time of the commencement of Act XXXI of 1958. In January 1959, an application was moved by the petitioner for repayment of the debt in accordance with the provisions of that Act. This was permitted. But Act XXXI of 1958 was later amended by Act II of 1961. The relevant change by the amending Act, for the purpose of this case, is the change made to the proviso to Clause (xi) of Section 2(c). The proviso, as it stood before the amendment was in these terms:

(3.) ON the above facts, counsel on behalf of the petitioner contends that Clause (xi) of Section 2(c) is not attracted at all. According to him, there has been no borrowing by a single transaction in this case. When he was confronted with the ruling reported in Oommen v Kottayam Orient Bonk Ltd., 1963 K. L. T. 1150: : 1963 K. L. J. 1111, where it has been held that in the case of an overdraft agreement with the bank, the transaction is really the overdraft agreement and not the individual borrowing pursuant to the overdraft agreement which accumulates the total due from a borrower to the bank, he contended that the decision will not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that applying the same principle as laid down in the decisions, it must be taken that there have been at least four transactions with the bank in this case. According to him, each overdraft agreement, entered into with the bank, in 1947, 1949, 1953 and 1955, represents a different transaction. It is not very clear in this case whether there have been separate overdraft agreements executed during each of the above years. It is, however, clear that security bonds have been executed in 1947, 1949, 1953 and 1955. Two views are possible. One is that there has been only one transaction of overdraft agreement with the bank and that there has been periodical fixing of the limit of the amount that could be borrowed. If that be so, the principle laid down in, 1963 K. L. T. at 1150 must apply and the petitioner can only repay the debt in accordance with the proviso to Clause (xi) of Section 2(c). If, on the other hand, there have been different transactions, that is, overdraft agreements in 1947, 1949, 1953 and,1955, these would be four separate transactions and each of those transactions, as I see it, will separately be hit by Clause (xi) of section 2(c). If that be so, I do not think that the petitioner would be entitled to combine the four transactions together and then apply to discharge the liabilities that had arisen under those four separate transactions and plead that the total liability did not arise under a single transaction. Strictly speaking, each of those liabilities will have to be discharged by a separate application. The petitioner would then have been obliged to repay the debt in each of those applications in accordance with the proviso to Clause (xi) of Section 2 (c). Such a result cannot be avoided by combining the four transactions together and making one application. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to succeed. In the view that I have taken in this case, I consider it unnecessary to accede to the request of counsel for the petitioner to implead the Syndicate Bank Limited, who, it is alleged in the counter affidavit fixed on behalf of the respondent - - though it has apparently ceased to exist - -has succeeded to the interests of the respondent. T would, have allowed this prayer if the petition was to be allowed. I dismiss the petition but make no order as to costs.