LAWS(KER)-1954-8-5

GOPALA PILLAI Vs. SANKARA IYER

Decided On August 09, 1954
GOPALA PILLAI Appellant
V/S
SANKARA IYER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of Kottayam holding that a creditor's application to adjudge a debtor as insolvent filed beyond the three months' period prescribed in S.9(1)(c) of the Travancore Insolvency Act (Act VIII of 1108) but on the next working day of the court after the expiration of the period was a petition filed within time. When the appeal first came up before a Division Bench the case was referred to a Full Bench for an authoritative decision as to whether the said period of three months "is a condition precedent or whether it is a period of limitation that can be extended". Since that order was made, a Full Bench of this Court had to consider a similar provision in S.75 of the Factories Act (Act VIII of 1114) and held that in view of S.10 of the General Clauses Act (II of 1072) a complaint filed beyond the six months' period prescribed in S.75, but on the next working day of the Court after the expiration of that period would be a complaint filed within time. State v. Govindan Asan 1952 KLT 211 = (1952) 7 D.L.R. Travancore Cochin 329. There was no direct decision of any court regarding the bearing of S.10 of the General Clauses Act on the period prescribed in S.75 of the Factories Act. The Full Bench therefore referred to the conflicting decisions of the various High Courts on the reaction of S.10 of the General Clauses Act on the provision in S.9(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act for guidance and following the view that S.10 of the General Clauses Act governed the three months' period in S.9(1)(c) held that the complaint filed on the next working day of the Court after the expiration of the six months' period was a good complaint. In that case, as here, on the date the prescribed period expired the Court was closed and the complaint was filed, as the petition in this case was filed, on the next working day. In our opinion that Full Bench decision correctly decides the question and following the principle enunciated there we hold that the period prescribed in S.9(1)(c) is a period of limitation to which S.4 of the Limitation Act (VI of 1100) as well as S.10 of the General Clauses Act should be made to apply.

(2.) The appeal will go back to the Division Bench for disposal.