MOIDUNNI Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These matters have been referred and placed before the Larger Bench on account of a common order dtd. 1/8/2024 in M.F.A. (Forest) Nos.168/2011 and 1/2015 by a Full Bench of this Court. The reference was necessitated on account of the fact that a Full Bench of this Court in Pankajakshy Amma v. Custodian of Vested Forests; 1995 (1) KLT 358 (FB) appears to have taken the view, on a consideration of the provisions contained in Sec. 8B of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1971 Act'), that the power of review conferred on the Tribunal by virtue of Sec. 8B(3) of the 1971 Act is a provision independent of Sec. 8B(1) and the grounds for review under Sec. 8B(3) of the 1971 Act are not circumscribed or controlled by the grounds mentioned in Sec. 8B(1) of the 1971 Act. A Division Bench of this Court in Ibrahim v. Custodian of Vested Forests; 2000 (3) KLT 812, however, took the view that the decision of the Full Bench in Pankajakshy Amma (supra) only meant that if the grounds mentioned in Sec. 8B(1) of the 1971 Act were existing and once it is found that a review is necessary upon grounds mentioned in that provision, the Tribunal could thereafter conduct a fresh hearing of the matter and take into account every aspect. In other words, at such a hearing (after review) it would be open to the Tribunal to consider all matters as if the application before the Tribunal had been restored for fresh adjudication. In Ibrahim (supra) the Division Bench drew sustenance for this view from the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sri Bagawati Tea Estates Ltd. and another v. Govt. of India and others, (1995) 2 SCC 452 and M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala and another; (2000) 1 SCC 666.

(2.) The issue, thereafter, again arose for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Thankappan v. State of Kerala; 2002 (3) KLT 275. In Thankappan (supra), the Division Bench again considered the law laid down in Pankajakshy Amma (supra) and held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bagawati Tea Estates (supra) did not in any way dilute the principle laid down in Pankajakshy Amma (supra) and held that the view in Ibrahim (supra) goes contrary to the law laid down in Pankajakshy Amma (supra).

(3.) When these Miscellaneous First Appeals were listed before a Division Bench of this Court, after referring to the Full Bench decision in Pankajakshy Amma (supra), and to the decisions in Ibrahim (supra) and Thankappan (supra), the Division Bench, prima facie, held that the proposition in Pankajakshy Amma (supra) did not lay down the correct law and the matter requires consideration by a Full Bench. It was accordingly that the matter came up before the Full Bench. The Full Bench through the order dtd. 1/8/2024 already referred to above also prima facie took the view that the power of review under Sec. 8B(3) was not independent of the grounds in Sec. 8B(1). In other words, the view taken was that it is only when the grounds mentioned in Sec. 8B(1) are available, can an application for review be maintained before the Tribunal. The referring bench, therefore, clearly doubted the law laid down in Pankajakshy Amma (supra). It is thus that this question falls for our consideration.