A V GEORGE Vs. CHANCELLOR, MAHATMA GANDHI UNIVERSITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition for review of the judgment dated 18.08.2014 in W.P.(C) No. 13809 of 2014. In the writ petition the challenge was against the action of the Chancellor of the University, in removing the petitioner from the post of Vice Chancellor, to which he was appointed, pursuant to the recommendations of a Search Committee, that was constituted for the purpose. It was in that context that the issues as to whether the Chancellor, while exercising powers under the Mahatma Gandhi University Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the MGU Act'), had inherent powers and could suo motu act in the matter of removal of a Vice Chancellor was gone into and decided in the judgment.

(2.) The review petition is premised on the contention that the issue as to whether a Chancellor under the Act could, in exercise of his inherent powers, disregard the recommendation of the Search Committee that had initially recommended the petitioner for appointment as Vice Chancellor, was not considered by this Court while deciding the writ petition. As an additional argument, it is also urged that the Chancellor of the University could not go behind the recommendations made by the Search Committee and had necessarily to appoint only one among the panel of names recommended to him to be the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is contended, therefore, that while exercising the inherent power to remove a person who was appointed as a Vice Chancellor, it was incumbent upon the Chancellor to consult the Search Committee that recommended the candidates for appointment as Vice Chancellor, and to ascertain from the said Committee, the procedure that was followed by them and whether there was any illegality or infirmity in the said recommendation that warranted a recalling of the said recommendations. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioner would contend that the issue as to what were the relevant factors which weighed with the Search Committee while recommending the petitioner, along with others, in the panel of names that was submitted to the Chancellor, was decided by the Chancellor without examining the members of the Search Committee and hence the Chancellor had committed a grave error in jurisdiction while arriving at his decision to remove the petitioner from the post of Vice Chancellor. It is, in particular, pointed out that the proceedings of the Search Committee were not minuted and therefore, the factors that weighed with the Search Committee while deciding upon the suitability of candidates for inclusion in the panel, could not be clearly ascertained in the absence of an enquiry with the members of the Search Committee. It is also pointed out that the Chancellor had relied on material that was furnished to him by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government, to whom the matter had been entrusted by the Chief Secretary, who in turn had been requested by the Chancellor to look into the complaints that had been received by the Chancellor with regard to the suitability of the petitioner for the post of Vice Chancellor. It is contended that the said material was one that was obtained behind the back of the petitioner, in as much as the petitioner's comments on the correctness of the data gathered had not been invited, or called for, before forwarding it to the Chancellor. It is vehemently contended that the reliance by the Chancellor on such material, which was inherently void and unreliable, while arriving at his decision, rendered his decision illegal. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decisions reported in Rama Shanker Misra v. Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, 1960 AIR(All) 247] for the proposition that it is not every misrepresentation that could be seen as disqualifying the petitioner who had sought appointment on the basis of such representations and that it was only those misrepresentations, as obtained for the petitioner a benefit that he would have otherwise not obtained, that could be treated as fatal so to disqualify the petitioner. The decisions in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta and another, 1971 AIR(SC) 2162] M. Shankaraiah and another v. State of Karnataka and others, 1993 Supp4 SCC 595] and State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, 2011 3 SCC 436] are relied upon for the proposition that, when there was any legal provision or fact that was not brought to the notice of the Court at the time of arguing the writ petition, the subsequent discovery of that provision or fact would be a valid ground for the exercise of review powers by this Court. Further, if facts relating to a dispute were not correctly placed, or the legal points urged, leading to a situation where the court proceeded on an erroneous assumption of the facts, then a review petition would be admissible for the purpose of preventing a miscarriage of justice.

(3.) The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents would counter the arguments of learned senior counsel, by pointing out that this is not a case where the Court would be justified in the exercise of its power to review a judgment. It is pointed out that the points urged by the review petitioner have already been considered by this Court in its judgment dated 18.08.2014 and any submission made with regard to the very same contentions would tantamount to arguing the writ petition afresh and this was not permissible in review proceedings. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Sow Chandra Kante and another v. Sheikh Habib, 1975 1 SCC 674], P.N. Eswara Iyer and others v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 1980 4 SCC 680] and Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors., 2013 AIR(SC) 3301] have been relied on to fortify the said contentions regarding the exercise of review power by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.