(1.) Whether the Division Bench before which the contempt petition is posted after a Single Judge has found that a prima facie case is made out against the respondent, is bound to proceed with the trial or can it dismiss the petition at that stage and drop the proceedings is the question which arises in the two contempt cases (civil) No. 807 of 2003 and 854 of 2004 which are being disposed of by this order. Since the question has to be answered in the light of the Contempt of Courts (High Court of Kerala) Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), it is not necessary at this stage to refer to the facts of either of the two cases.
(2.) R.6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 16 are relevant for our purpose and these may first be noticed.
(3.) From the scheme of Rules as discussed above, it is clear that it is the Division Bench alone which has to take cognizance of the contempt petition and the Single Judge in the case of a civil contempt has only to hold a preliminary enquiry to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not. The second proviso to R.6 enables the Single Judge to drop the proceedings if, according to him, no prima facie case is made out against the respondent. But, if he finds that there is a prima facie case, the mater will have to be posted before the Division Bench for a preliminary hearing which alone will take cognizance of the contempt petition. It need not issue notice to the respondent and could dismiss the petition at the preliminary hearing and even where notice is issued, the petition could be dismissed and proceedings dropped after considering the reply of the respondent. It is, thus, clear that the Division Bench is not bound to proceed with the trial merely because the learned Single Judge, after holding a preliminary enquiry, has found a prima facie case against the respondent. What is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that when the learned Single Judge issued notice to the contemner, the proceedings for contempt had been initiated and he having come to the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out, the Division Bench is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the learned Single Judge and, therefore, the contemners have to be tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed in R.16. He cited a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Babu Premarajan v. Superintendent of Police, 2000 (3) KLT 177 and Purshotam Das Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon and Others, 1978 (2) SCC 370 in support of his contention. The argument is, indeed, fallacious and cannot be accepted. When the learned Single Judge issued notice to the contemner, it was only for the purpose of holding a preliminary enquiry to find out whether there was a prima facie case to proceed against the contemner. The issuance of that notice did not amount to initiation of contempt proceedings. R.6 clearly stipulates that every proceeding for contempt has to be dealt with by a Bench of not less than two Judges. It is, thus, clear that it is only the Division Bench which can initiate contempt proceedings and if it finds that no prima facie case is made out or it does not agree with the view expressed by the Single Judge in this regard, it can dismiss the contempt petition and drop the proceedings. Babu Premarajan's case (supra) does not deal with the contempt of court rules. The provisions of S.3 of the Kerala High Court Act came up for consideration before the Full Bench and the question which has arisen before us did not arise before the Full Bench. This judgment does not advance the case of the petitioners. Similarly, Justice. B. S. Dhillon's case (supra) does not deal with the issue that arises for consideration before us. In that case, it was held that no appeal would lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceedings for contempt. It is true that it was observed that proceedings for contempt are initiated by issuance of a notice, but their Lordships were not dealing with provisions similar to the Rules framed by the Kerala High Court. It was held that an order merely initiating the proceedings without anything further was not appealable under S.19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. This judgment also does not advance the case of the petitioners. Some other judgments were also cited which are on an entirely different set of facts and do not throw any light on the issue which has been canvassed before us. In this view of the matter, the question posted in the earlier part of the judgment has to be answered in the negative.