CHARULATHA Vs. MANJU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a revision by a tenant under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act ). Respondent herein who was the petitioner before the Rent Control Court , filed an application for eviction. Revision petitioner filed objection to the petition contending that the petitioner is not the owner and that there is no landlord-tenant relationship. The case of the tenant was that there is no tenancy arrangement between herself and the respondent herein. At present, we are not very much concerned about the rival contentions raised by the landlady and tenant.

(2.) TO prove the rent deed, landlady examined Pws. 3 and 4 on 21-6-1993. Tenant did not cross examine the above witnesses on that day due to the non-availability of her advocate and so she prayed for time to cross examine the witnesses after lunch. It is stated in the revision memorandum that the witness, Pw. 3, expressed some inconvenience and the examination of the above witness was adjourned to 3-7-1993. It is also stated in the revision memorandum that on 3-7-1993, the matter was taken up immediately after the roll call. Since nobody cross examined the witnesses, the Rent Control Court recorded in the deposition no cross'.

(3.) S. 18 of the Act provides for appeal. S. 18 (1) (b) of the act reads thus: - 18 (1) (b): "any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court, may within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction, in computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded". Assuming that the order challenged is an appealable order whether the appellate authority is bound in all circumstances to issue notice to the respondent and call for the records of the case. In 1991 (1) KLT 453 (Sumathi v. Devasan) and 1991 (2) KLT 487 (Luiz v. sadanandan) this court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. In 1991 (1) KLT 453, considering the very question under S. 18 of the Act, the Court observed thus: "it is not that this distinction is kept in mind by the appellate or revisional authorities functioning under the Act with the result orders of the nature impugned in this case are subjected to appeal. A weeding out of such frivolous appeals or revisions at the threshold before issue of notice is called for lest parties arc enabled to protract the proceedings against the very avowed philosophy of the enactment enjoining expeditious disposal of proceedings under the Act". In 1991 (2) KLT 487, a Division Bench of this. Court, considering the question whether this Court exercising the jurisdiction under S. 20 of the Act is bound to issue notice to the respondent in all cases, said: "it is not as if this Court should issue notice or call for the records in all cases before declining to interfere with the order of the appellate authority. When the power of interference is limited, this court has to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case warranting interference, in which case alone this court is bound to issue notice or to call for the records. This power to weed out frivolous matters is inherent and can be exercised even without an express provision as under Order 41 Rule 11 when the power is otherwise inherent in this court". It is pertinent to notice that though the Division Bench was considering a question regarding the in limine dismissal of the revision, the Division Bench specifically said that whenever a power of appeal is given that power carries with it an inherent power to dispose of the appeal without issuing notice to the respondent. This inherent power is necessary to weed out frivolous appeals, This is the power that inheres with an appellate authority for the purpose of discharging its appellate power in meaningful and realistic mode of procedure.