(1.) This is a bid to axe down a claim made on the petitioner by his erstwhile wife as per S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short 'the Muslim Women Act') with an ingenious contention that the claim is barred by limitation.
(2.) Petitioner and first respondent were husband and wife. Two children were born in the wed-lock. On 18-1-1986 the marriage was dissolved. Six and a half years later i.e., on 16-7-1992 the first respondent (former wife) filed the application before a judicial magistrate of first class claiming reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. When petitioner got notice from the lower court, he filed the present petition invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash the claim on the ground of limitation.
(3.) Contention of the petitioner is founded on Art.137 of the Third Division of Second Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act'). As per the said Article, a period of three years is prescribed for "any other application for which no period is provided elsewhere in this Division" from when the right to apply accrues. According to the learned counsel, right to apply would have accrued at least on the expiry of "iddat" period which followed dissolution of marriage. He pointed out that even though the Muslim Women Act came into force only on 19-5-1986, S.3 got retrospective operation as held by a learned single Judge of this Court in Hyderkhan v. Meharunnissa ( 1992 (2) KLT 330 ).