K K BHASKARAN Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I do not think the Petitioner is entitled to the relief in the matter. The question raised by the Petitioner has been considered by the Supreme Court in A. C. Industries Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( AIR 1962 SC 1100 ). There, though they were dealing with the question of S.72 I. D. Act, 1947, as stood prior to the amendment Act of 1956, the Court had to consider the question as to whether an Advocate who was appointed as an Industrial Tribunal, was qualified for appointment as the High Court Judge. The Supreme Court said:

(2.) Mr. Bhaskaran referred to certain other articles in the Constitution like Art.58, 157, 84 and 102. Art.58 under the heading "Qualifications for election as President" has stated that no person shall be eligible for election as President unless he has completed the age of 35 years But then it states that no person shall be eligible for election as President unless he is qualified for election as a member of the House of the People. We find some distinction made there between qualifications and eligibility. Art.157 which is under the heading "Qualifications for appointment as Governor" states only that no person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed the age of 35 years. Art.84 while prescribing qualification for membership of Parliament states that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless he is a citizen of India and in the case of a seat in the Council of States not less than 35 years of age and in the case of a seat in the House of the People, not less than 25 years of age. No doubt here it may be said that the age fixed is more or less treated as a qualification for becoming a member of Parliament. Art.102 prescribes disqualification for membership to the houses of Parliament. No doubt it is a sound rule of construction as said by Cleasby B. in Courtauld v. Legh (1869) LR 4 Ex.126, at 130 to give same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament. But this presumption that same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight and it is proper, if sufficient reason can be assigned to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that it bears in another part of an Act (See Re. National Savings Bank (1866) LR 1 Ch. App, 547, 550 and R. v. Burt (1960) 1 QB 625. Justice Fry said in Re Moddy and Yates Contract (1885) 30 Ch. D. 344) that if a word is used inaccurately in a section of a statute, it must not be assumed to have been used inaccurately when it occurs in another section of the same Statute. A word can be used in different provisions of a Statute in totally different senses.

(3.) Apart from the fact that I am bound to follow the Supreme Court decision, I would point out, with respect, that in the context in which the word 'qualification' occurs in Art.217 non attainment of a particular age is not regarded there as a qualification. It is only in the nature of a condition governing the appointment to the office, as Justice Venkatarama Iyer pointed out, not a qualification with reference to a person who has to be appointed thereto. Therefore, I find no illegality in the appointment of the 2nd Respondent as Advocate General, though he might have passed the age of 62.