DEVASSU Vs. ST MARYS FORANE CHURCH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Original Petition is filed by the first counter petitioner in R C. P No. 10 of 1981 pending before the Rent Controller's Court, palai. St. Mary's Forane Church, Kuravilangad represented by its Kaikars the first respondent herein, has filed the above R. C. P. under S. 11 (3) and (4) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, 'the Act' for short, for eviction of the petitioner and respondents 2 to 9 herein. The Church has got a storied building with number of rooms. The petitioner and respondents 2 to 9 are tenants of separate rooms in the building. The petitioner has got in his possession four rooms. There is no controversy that the tenancies are independent tenancies and the tenants are in occupation of distinct portions of the building.

(2.) WHEN the rent control petition had been filed, the petitioner and respondents 2 to 5 questioned the maintainability of the petition for eviction and the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition on the ground that a single petition for eviction of tenants whose tenancies are separate, distinct and independent is not maintainable. The Rent control Court, the 10th respondent herein has overruled that contention and has held that the petition is maintainable. Ext. PI is the order and that is questioned in this O. P.

(3.) IN the other decision of this court, viz. , C. R. P. Nos. 1129,1226 and 1252 of 1977, the facts were these: Two landlords brought a common petition for evicting 6 tenants who were in occupation of various rooms in one single building. The building consisted of 9 rooms of which 4 rooms were owned by one landlord and the other 4 rooms by another landlord, The petition was on the basis that the building was over 50 years old and was in a dilapidated condition and therefore it needed reconstruction. The Rent Control Court allowed the eviction. The tenants filed unsuccessful appeals and revisions before the appellate authority and the revisional court. When the matter came up before this court, on the plea that the eviction petition was bad for misjoinder of persons who were holding under separate engagements had been impleaded in one single petition, this court said: "it is true that the rental arrangements between the lardlords and the several tenants were separate and independent but it cannot be denied that if separate petitions were brought they would have raised not only similar but even identical questions as the petition was grounded on the bona fide need of the landlords to reconstruct the entire building. The question of the licence, plan and the landlords' means to reconstruct would also have been common questions in all the petitions. I should have thought that it would have been not only in the interest of the landlords but of the tenants themselves if all the questions were agitated in one single proceeding. But despite the objection of the tenants raised in this court as also in the courts below, I have not been told how or where they have suffered any failure of justice by being proceeded against in one single petition. I am not therefore inclined to uphold this complaint in those revisions and hold that the proceeding was vitiated by the alleged misjoinder of parties and causes of action. " No doubt, as contended before me by Mr. Krishnan Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner, in those two cases the High Court had refused to interfere in revision from orders of eviction. IN the present case, the OP. has been filed from the preliminary order of the Rent Controller that he has jurisdiction to entertain the matter for eviction of different tenants in one single petition. Certainly there is a difference. What this court will then have to consider is, is there such an absolute lack of jurisdiction as such in the Rent Control Court to entertain a single petition for eviction of tenants who have taken distinct parts of the same structure on independent tenancies? 7. Mr. Krishnan Nair posed a question a pertinent question certainly whether a suit could be brought forward by a landlord against a number of tenants who have been inducted into different properties of the landlord or distinct portions of the same property under separate tenancies for eviction. He pointed out that in such a case, the cause of action against the different tenants being different, the suit will be bad for misjoinder of causes of action. Causes of action against the different tenants being different, the suit will be bad for misjoinder of causes of action and parties. It is true that under 0. 2. Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendants jointly. But their joint interest in the main questions raised by the litigation is a condition precedent to the joinder of several causes of action against several defendants. If the causes of action alleged are separate and the defendants are arrayed in different sets, the suit will be bad for misjoinder of defendants and causes of action and is technically multifarious. According to Mr. Krishnan Nair, each contract of tenancy being different, one petition for eviction of all the tenants cannot be maintained He would point out that when the Supreme Court said in S. N. G. Chetty v. Ganeshan (AIR. 1975 sc. 1750) in reply to a contention that a single petition with regard to two different tenancies, although in the same premises, are for residential purposes and the other for non-residential purposes is not maintainable, that there is no substance in the contention when the tenancy is one, it naturally means, that such a contention would be relevant and acceptable if there are different tenancies. 8. Mr. Krishnan Nair's contention is quite correct if the cause of action against each tenant is different. Namasivaya v. Kadir Ammal (ILR. 17 Madras 168) is a case in point. There "seven different manufacturers enter into seven different contracts with A to manufacture salt for A, and to deliver it in his factory. A, alleging that all the seven persons had failed to deliver salt according to the terms of the agreement with them brings one suit against them for a decree that they might be directed to deliver the salt to him. The suit is bad for multifariousness, for the breach of each contract gives rise to a distinct cause of action, and no one defendant is interested in any of the causes of action arising from the breach of contract with the other defendant. " 9. But, in this case, the landlord has brought the petition for eviction of several tenants from the rooms in their possession in a single building on the ground that be requires reconstruction of the building. It might be noted that in the petition itself he has stated that in respect of the persons concerned, the contract tenancies have ceased to exist and they are now continuing as statutory tenants on the basis of the Rent control Act. The exact wording used is: Under S. 11 (4) of the Act, if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Court that he has the plan and licence if any required and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction, a tenant could be evicted. A building as defined in the Act will take in a part of a building. The landlord has required here, the reconstruction of the whole building, parts of which have been let to different tenants, each part separately let will come within the definition of the term 'building' But, then it is not a part of a structure that the landlord requires reconstruction, but the whole structure. IN such circumstances, the cause of action really cannot be split up against each tenant. It is more or less the same cause of action. 10. It might be noted that under Order I, R. 3, all persons may be joined in one suit as defendants where any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transaction is alleged to exist against such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative and if separate suits were brought against such persons any common question of law or fact would arise. Under this rule, all persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of the same act or transaction is alleged to exist, where if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise, even though the causes of action against the defendants may be different. A plaintiff is entitled under this rule to join several defendants in respect of several and distinct causes of action subject to the discretion of the Court to strike out one or more of the defendants if he thinks it right to do so. See Payne v. British Time Recorder C. (1921) 2 K. B 1, Narendranath v. Purna Chandra (1928) 55 Cal. 64 and Bhagvan versus Balku (1931) 33 Born. LIZ 1291. Referring to the aforementioned English Cases as also to Anukul Chandra v. Province of Bengal (47) A. C. 374 and Marutirao Govindrao v. Nathmal Jodhraj (1947) Nag. 124, Mulla states in his 'code of Civil Procedure' that as a general rule, where claims against different parties involve or may involve a common question of fact bearing sufficient importance in proportion to the rest of the action to render it desirable that the whole of the matter be disposed of at the same time, the Court will allow the joinder of defendants, subject to its discretion as to how the action should be tried. Joinder of parties and joinder of cause of action are discretionary in this sense. That if they are joined, there is no absolute right to have them struck out. But it is discretionary in the Court to do so if it thinks right. See Thomas v. Moore (1981) I K. B. 555 at 565 and Randhan Puri v. Lachmi Narnin (47 PC. 42 ). It is not necessary that the defendants should be interested in all the reliefs or that their liability should be the same. It is essential however that there should be some nexus such as will satisfy the condition as to the existence of the same act or transaction or series of acts and transactions. It might be noted that this court has held in Joseph v. Makkbru (AIR. 1960 Kerala 127) that the owner of land is entitled to file one suit against all persons who bad trespassed on it as he has a right to recover the plot whole and entire, and not in bits and fragments. 11. Though this is not a suit and the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, other than those expressly made applicable would apply here, the general principles adumbrated in Order I CPC. could be made applicable. As Justice Balagangadharan Nair pointed out in his decision rendered in CRP. Nos. 1129,1226 & 1252 of 1977, it would be in the interest of landlords and all the tenants themselves if all questions arising in a case for eviction where the landlord required the building for bona fide reconstruction were agitated in one single proceeding. The principal question in the case would be whether the landlord bona fide requires the building for reconstruction. IN meeting this case there may not be any conflict between the contentions of the tenants inter se. And a statutory tribunal may well be within its rights if it allows the junction of all such tenants in one single petition. That would be well within the inherent jurisdiction which is there even with tribunals of limited jurisdiction as I pointed out in Dy. Conservator v. Sarojini (1981 KLT. 179 :. 1980 KLN. 28 ). The inherent power of tribunals including that of limited tribunals had been discussed in clear and lucid manner, if I may say so with respect, by my learned brother Justice M P. Menon in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunjipathumma (1981 KLT. 495) IN the above view, I see no reason to interfere in the matter. O. P. is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without costs. Dismissed. . .