E MOHAMMAD Vs. KUNHAHAMMAD HAJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE office note indicates that there is a delay of six days in filing the appeal to this Court. According to counsel for the appellant the delay is only of one day and the note put up by the office indicating that there is a delay of six days is erroneous. As to the delay of one day, an explanation has been offered by counsel and it is urged that the delay ought to be excused. Since the difference between the number of days of delay as noticed by the office and as contended by counsel for the petitioner has arisen from the different approaches made in the matter of reckoning of days to be excluded and since the question is of quite common occurrence, I should go into this matter in detail.

(2.) THE relevant dates for the purpose of this appeal are the following: Table:#1

(3.) S. 12 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that when computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. Therefore the date of the judgment has necessarily to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The provision in S. 12 (2) enables the exclusion of the day on which the judgment was pronounced as also the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. What exactly is meant by "time requisite?". Since the question has received judicial notice, I would rather notice the relevant decisions than go into this question elaborately. In Ramakrishna v. Shrawan (AIR. 1944 Nag. 356)Bose J. said thus; "in the first place, it is accepted that the day on which the copies are applied for and the day on which they are delivered are both to be excluded. Why? Because the law takes no account of the fractions of a day. In some cases a copy is delivered the moment the office opens at 10 or 11 in the morning and the appeal is filed the same day. But in other cases, instead of the copy being delivered the first thing it is delivered the last and that gives the appellant no chance of filing the appeal on the same day however diligent he may be. The law ignores all these possibilities. It does not compel the appellant to file the appeal on the same day nor does it require the Courts to determine the exact moment the copy is delivered. Instead it takes no account of the fractions of a day and gives the appellant the benefit of both days, the day on which he applies and the day on which be receives the copy. " The same view had been expressed as early as in 1882 by the High Court of Travancore in I. T. L. R. Appendix Page 7. This Court has, in vijayan v. Parvathy (1960 KLT. 1330), followed this view. The decisions of the nagpur High Court in Ramakrishna v. Shrawan (AIR. 1944 Nag. 356) and the Madras high Court in Ramaseshayya v. Venkatarathnam (AIR. 1938 Mad. 823) were also referred to and followed by this Court.