JANARDHANAN PILLAI Vs. KARTHYAYANI AMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises in execution. D. R. P. No. 4 of 1963 of the Punalur Munsiff's court related to the redemption of a mortgage under S.11 of the Act 31 of 1958, hereinafter referred to as the old Act. Necessary initial payments were made under the old Act and there was a decree for redemption in terms of S.11. Thereafter, the balance instalments were not paid and therefore execution was taken out for payment of the balance amount. In the meantime Act 11 of 1970, hereinafter referred to as the new Act, came Into force repealing the old Act. The judgment debtor filed E. A. No. 529 of 1971 before the execution court requesting that he be allowed to pay the balance towards the decree under S.4 and 5 of the new Act on the ground that the balance amount represented a debt in terms of the new Act. This was resisted by the decree holder. The execution court as well as the appellate Court upheld the objections of the decree holder and rejected the prayer of the judgment debtor. Hence this second appeal.

(2.) The question mooted before me is that the balance amount payable under the old decree came within the definition of the word 'debt' occurring in S.2(4) of the new Act, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:

(3.) But the learned counsel for the respondents contended that decree debt will not come within the purview of the new Act for the reason that the definition in the new Act is not the same as the definition in the old Act. In the old Act the word 'debt' is defined as above with the addition of the words "and includes any debt or balance of debt due at the commencement of this Act under the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment of Debts) Act, 1955 or the Travancore - Cochin Indebted Agriculturists Relief Act, 1956 ........."It is contended on the basis of the difference in these two definitions that the amount due under the old Act has been excluded from the definition of the word 'debt' in the new Act. This argument has found favour with the Courts below. I think, justice in the case also admits such a construction of the definition. It cannot be that the indebted agriculturists, who were given benefit under the old Act, should be given a further lease of life by the new Act. Execution was occasioned because of the failure on the part of the judgment debtor to pay up the instalments due under the old Act. I therefore accept the contention of the counsel for the respondents and hold that the 'debt' occurring in the new Act does not take in the balance decree amount due under the old Act.