LEKSHMI Vs. NARAYANA IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short but interesting question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to the effect of the striking down, as unconstitutional by this Court of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, Kerala Act 4 of 1961, on the repeal, effected by this Statute, of the Malabar Tenancy . Act, 1929, Madras Act 14 of 1930, as amended from time to time. That depends upon the construction to be placed on Art. 13(2) of the Constitution.

(2.) THE question arises this way. THE Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, enacted no doubt by the Madras Legislature, was in force, in what I may compendiously call the Malabar area, and also portions of the South Kanara District which became part of the Kerala State after the States Reorganisation. In fact, the preamble to the Malabar Tenancy Act itself states that it is enacted for the purpose of defining, declaring, etc., the law relating to landlord and tenant in the District of Malabar and certain neighbouring areas in the State of Madras. Under sub-section (2) of S. 1, the Act extends to the whole of the District of Malabar, to the Gudalur Taluk of the Nilgiris District and to the villages in the South Kanara District specified in the schedule. In fact, the schedule gives a list of about 33 villages. Only some of those villages, which formed part of the original South Kanara District and referred to in the schedule came into the Kerala State. We are not also concerned with the application of the Act to the Gudalur Taluk of the Nilgiris District because that area does not form part of the Kerala State.

(3.) SO far as the challenge made by the landlord from the Cochin area was concerned, the Supreme Court did not accept the challenge. The decision of the Supreme Court on this matter is reported in Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala 1962 KLT. SC. 1. In this decision, Their Lordships held that the lands held by the petitioner before them from the Cochin area are an 'estate' under clause (2)(a) of Art. 31-A of the Constitution and, therefore, the Act is protected under Art. 31-A(2) (a) and, therefore, not open to be challenged on the ground that the material provisions of the statute offend Arts. 14 19 and 31.