(1.) The only question arising for decision in this second appeal by the judgment debtor is whether the amendment of the decree gives a fresh starting point of limitation. The judgment debtor objected to execution of the decree on the ground of limitation, contending that the amendment was a formal one relating to the description of the 1st plaintiff and that the decree was an executable one in its unamended form or that the amendment was unnecessary. Though there was divergence of judicial opinion at one time, it may now be taken as settled law that the words of Art.182 are to be given their plain meaning. Following the construction of the word "Appeal" in Art.182(2) by the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey. ( AIR 1932 PC 165 ) it was held by Beasley, C.J. in Lekshmikanta Rao v. Medella Ramayya ( AIR 1935 Mad. 97 ):
(2.) This view has been adopted by other High Courts also. A Full Bench of the Travancore High Court accepted this principle in Subramonia Pillai v. Kali Pillai (1946 TLR 956). It is not competent for the court executing the decree to sit in appeal on the decision of the Court amending the decree. The order of the court below is correct and this Second Appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.