SANKARAN NAIR Vs. BHARGAVI PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A Nair husband whose marriage was dissolved under the travancore Nair Act II of 1100, is the appellant. The appellant's wife presented a petition in the District Munsiff's Court of Quilon on 28-3-1122 , praying for dissolution of her marriage, on the ground of habitual cruelty and adultery of her husband. Their marriage took place on 10-10-1119. The wife who was petitioner in the court below alleged that she was taken by her husband to her family house in Kumbhom 1120 for her first confinement and that a child was born to her on 8-10-1120. It was alleged that since Kumbhom 1120 the husband was persistently neglecting to maintain her, that the husband did not even meet the expenses in connection with the birth of their child and that he had neglected to maintain the child also. The husband was alleged to be living in adultery with a Pulaya woman. The petitioner claimed a sum of Rs. 3000/- as compensation.

(2.) THE appellant filed objections on 18-6-1122. He denied the charge of adultery; but admitted that he had not been maintaining or looking after his wife and child. He stated that he had sent a sum of Rs. 30/- to his wife and a silver zone and a small gold ring for the child. He further contended that the failure to maintain them was due to the refusal of the wife to live with him. THE wife filed a rejoinder, reiterating the averments in her main petition, and denying receipt of the sum of Rs. 30/- and the jewels. THE following issues arising from the pleadings were framed by the trial court on 13-10-1123 : (1) Whether the grounds alleged in the petition for dissolution of marriage are true. (2) Whether they are sufficient for dissolution of marriage. (3) What is the amount of compensation awardable.

(3.) THE main attack against the decision of the trial court was that there was no legal evidence to support the finding that the appellant was guilty of adultery. In the view that we take on the question of habitual cruelty it is unnecessary to express an opinion as to whether appellant was guilty of adultery as alleged. THE learned counsel for the respondent stated that there was evidence to support the finding of adultery. He was however prepared to rest his case on the finding that the husband was guilty of habitual cruelty. This expression, "habitual cruelty" has been defined in the explanation to section 7 (3) to include persistent neglect on the part of the husband to maintain his wife. As already observed the appellant did not deny the allegation in the petition for dissolution, that he had not been maintaining his wife from the time she left his house in 1120. He sought to justify his conduct on the ground that she refused to go and stay with him without just cause. On this point, the court is bound to accept the verdict of the delegates. It is unnecessary to refer to the rulings under the indian Divorce Act, which were cited at the Bar, as the provisions in the travancore Nair Act differ from the Indian Divorce Act in several material respects. Under Section 7 (8) of the Travancore Act "the decision on the facts in respect of the grounds for dissolution shall be the decision of the delegates" but in cases governed by the Indian Divorce Act appellate courts can go into questions of fact decided by the trial court. It was not disputed before us that the question whether the appellant was guilty of habitual cruelty was a question of fact. THE trial court was bound to accept this finding returned by the delegates and it is not open to us, either, to examine the evidence on this point afresh. We therefore confirm the decision of the trial court allowing dissolution of the marriage.