LAWS(KER)-1953-9-6

ABRAHAM Vs. STATE

Decided On September 28, 1953
ABRAHAM Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of Subramonia Iyer, J. dismissing a writ application in limine.

(2.) The appellant was a Superintendent in the Government Secretariate, Trivandrum. By an order dated 2nd August 1949 he was placed under suspension. By a subsequent order of 8th September 1949 he was compulsorily retired from service. The second order stated that he will be given 'full pension'. The application before the learned Judge was to quash these orders and for a writ of mandamus or such other directions as the Court may think it necessary for reinstating the petitioner to his former office and to reimburse him for the loss of pay and other emoluments, for the period he was kept out of it. The learned Judge dismissed the application stating that the second prayer was inadmissible even if the first prayer were to be granted and that in the circumstances of the case the petitioner had no 'cause of action' against the Government with respect to the first prayer. No notice was issued to the Government before the petition was dismissed.

(3.) Regard being had to the facts of the case, we do not think it necessary to pronounce upon whether the learned Judge was right in his view that the appellant had no cause of action or cause for complaint against the two impugned orders. Both the orders were passed before the Constitution of India came into force, but in view of the decision in this Court in Muthuswamy Ayyar Subramonia Ayyar v. State 1949 TCLR 270 it is not open to us to hold that we cannot review these orders as they were passed during the PreConstitution days. In 1949 TCLR 270 the Full Bench held (Govinda Menon, J. doubting) that 'on proper cause being shown this Court will issue any one of the prerogative writs which a Court of record and a Superior Court will issue elsewhere under similar circumstances'. Notwithstanding this decision we do not feel persuaded to go into the merits of the appellant's case; our reason being that it is after inordinate delay that the appellant approached this Court for the redress of his grievances.