SIVATHANUVAN THAMPI Vs. PATHUMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant in A. S. 588 of 1124, who is the judgment-debtor in O. S. No. 1347 of 1105 on the file of the Kuzhithura district Munsiff's Court, has been discharging the decree-debt by depositing in court the instalments as contemplated by section 9 of the Travancore Debt relief Act (Act II of 1116 as amended by Act III of 1116 ). THE amount of the decree-debt as due on 31-1-1116 was fixed by the court at 20,300 fanams. 80% of this amount comes to 16,240 fanams. THE instalment amounts deposited by the judgment-debtor come to an aggregate of 17,094 fanams. On 9-2-1124 he filed a petition C. M. P. No. 1596 praying for a declaration that the entire decree amount has been discharged with the payment of 16,272 fanams representing the 80% of the debt found due under the decree and for a refund of the excess amount. THE position taken up by him is that the amount of the debt fixed at 20,300 fanams by the order of the court, represents the maximum amount of the debt that can be deemed to be payable under the decree on a calculation being made subject to the limitation imposed by section 11 of the Debt Relief Act and that as such he is not liable to pay anything by way of interest on the 80% of the debt which he had already deposited in court. THE decree-holder, on the other hand, contended that for getting a discharge of the debt as contemplated by sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act, the judgment-debtor has to pay the future interest also on the 80% of the debt which he had already deposited. THE lower court upheld the decree-holder's contention as correct and accordingly dismissed the judgment-debtor's petition. It is against that order that the judgment-debtor has preferred A. S. No. 588 of 1124. THE appeal first came up for hearing before a Division Bench. On hearing the arguments of the learned advocates on both sides, the Division Bench felt that the question raised in the appeal as to the correct interpretation to be put upon sections 9 and 11 of the Debt Relief Act is an important one and that the decision on this question will determine the fate of a large number of petitions filed under section 9 and pending final orders and also that the decision in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476), which is in support of the position taken up by the decree-holder-respondent, requires reconsideration. Accordingly the Division bench referred the appeal for decision by a Full Bench. THE following specific point was also formulated for an authoritative ruling by the Full Bench: "can future interest on a decree debt sought to be discharged under sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act exceed the maximum limit prescribed by section 11 of the act at any stage of the proceedings under sections 8 and 9? Can the operation of section 11 be restricted to the stage of fixing the rate of instalments payable under section 9? Is there any warrant or justification for thus restricting the application of section 11?"

(2.) THE very same question is involved in A. S. No. 91/50 also which is an appeal by the decree-holder in O. S. No. 1084 of 1103 on the file of the Thiruvella District Munsiff's Court. While the decree in that case was being executed in the Chengannoor District Munsiff's Court, the judgment-debtor sought to have the decree debt discharged by making deposits into court of the instalments as required by section 9 of the Debt Relief Act. After depositing a series of instalment amounts, he filed a petition C. M. P. 10165 Gated 27-7-1124 praying for a declaration that more than the amount required for getting a discharge of the decree-debt has already been deposited by him and also for an order for refund of the excess amount standing to his credit. He too was taking his stand on section 11 of the Debt Relief Act regarding the maximum amount which he is liable to pay under the decree. THE execution court upheld his contention that he is not liable to pay anything by way of interest in excess of the limit fixed by section 11 of the Act and accordingly directed the office to prepare a statement showing the maximum amount due under section 11 and also the total of the deposit made by the judgment-debtor. THE view taken by the lower court is challenged by the decree-holder in A. S. 91 of 1950 also. THE Division Bench which heard this appeal in the first instance referred this appeal also to be heard and decided by a Full Bench along with A. S. 588 of 1124, in view of the fact that the main question for decision is common to both the appeals. This is how these two appeals have come up before this Full Bench.

(3.) IN interpreting the different provisions in the same or similar statutes, it is an accepted rule of guidance that the same or similar words would be generally used by the Legislature in giving expression to the same or similar ideas intended to be conveyed by the different provisions in such statutes. If really the Legislature intended to confine the operation of section 11 merely to the fixation of the amount due on 31-1-1116, it was easy enough to use the expression "in determining the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116 for the purpose of fixing the instalment payable under section 9," in the place of the expression,'in determining the amount of the decree debt for the purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9", as is now used in the opening portion of section 11. Without thus redrafting the section or reading the new expressions as suggested above into the section as it stands, it is difficult to construe the section in such a way as to limit its operation ' to the stage of ascertaining the debt due on 31-1-1116 and fixing the instalment payment under section 9. It is not the function of the court to attempt to so redraft the section or to read more words into it and thus to restrict its scope. The court has only to take the section as it stands and to construe it in accordance with the idea legitimately conveyed by the actual expressions used by the Legislature. It cannot be said that the expression "for the purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" as used in section 11 can have reference only to the calculation and ascertainment of the debt for the fixing of the instalment. No doubt the word "payment" will take in the idea of "payment in instalments" but if the idea of "instalment" alone was meant to be conveyed by the word "payment", the reference to section 8 in section 11 becomes unnecessary and superfluous, because the idea of "payment" in instalments is fully conveyed by the reference to section 9 alone. Section 8 is the section relating to the discharge of the entire debt by part payment as specified in section 9. No doubt the idea of discharge by such payment is repeated in section 9 also. Both these sections have been referred to in section 11 for the obvious reason that the payment contemplated by the latter section is the payment towards a complete discharge of the decree-debt. The non-mention of the word "discharge" in section 11 cannot be taken to mean that the section did not contemplate a discharge of the debt. Payments under section 9 are made to secure a discharge of the debt under section 8. The debt is not discharged without such payments being made. Thus the proper and legitimate construction to be put upon the expression "for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" would be to understand it as referring to payment resulting in a discharge of the debt under sections 8 and 9, and not merely to a fixation of the instalment for the purpose of payment under section 9. This construction is quite in fitting with the idea of placing a maximum limit in the accrual of future interest in the case of decree-debts, as apparently conveyed by the general and unqualified form in which section 11 is drafted. To construe otherwise would be substituting the word "instalments" for the word "payment" as used in the section.