SHAREEF @ MOHAMMED YUSUF @ FAROOQ Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is accused No. 7 in S.C. No. 2 of 2013 on the file of the Special Court for Trial of N.I.A. cases, Kerala, Ernakulam The allegation against the accused is that they committed the offences under Ss. 489B, 489C read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Ss. 15 and 17 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'UAP Act'). The appellant was arrested on 26.3.2013 at 5.10 hours at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi on his arrival from Abu Dhabi. He was produced before the Special Judge for N.I.A. cases at New Delhi and on the issuance of a transit warrant, the appellant was produced before the court below on 27.3.2013. He was remanded to judicial custody. The investigation was not completed within ninety days. The Public Prosecutor filed an application under the first proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 43D of U.A.P. Act. In that application, extension of time upto 180 days for completing the investigation was prayed for. The court below allowed the application filed by the Public Prosecutor overruling the objections raised by the appellant. The Criminal Appeal is filed against the said order passed by the court below.

(2.) Sri. Pramod, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the order impugned is unsustainable on several grounds. He submitted that the reasons stated in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor for extension of the period for completing the investigation are not sufficient for invoking the proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 43D of the U.A.P. Act. It is submitted that the requirements of the said proviso have not been satisfied in the present case and, therefore, the court below was not justified in granting the prayer for extension of time. The learned counsel also submitted that originally the offences alleged against the accused were only under Ss. 489B and 489C read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Ss. 15 and 17 of the UAP Act were subsequently included. However, going by the allegation made by the respondent, the appellant has indulged in financial terrorism. But financial terrorism was included as an offence under the U.A.P. Act only by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2012 (Act 3 of 2013), which came into force only on 3.1.2013. The learned counsel submitted that the offence was alleged to have been committed before coming into force of Act 3 of 2013. Extension of the period for completing the investigation, so as to avoid the operation of the proviso to S. 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could be made only if an offence is made out under the UAP Act. In the case of offences under Ss. 489B and 489C read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the period for completing the investigation cannot be extended by the court.

(3.) In reply, Sri. M. Ajay, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the allegations made against the appellant would constitute a terrorist act under clause (a) of S. 15 of the U.A.P. Act. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the definition of "property" under S. 2(h) of the U.A.P. Act is to be read along with S. 15 of the said Act. Sri. Ajay submitted that even by the interpretation of terrorist act as defined in the U.A.P. Act, before its amendment by Act 3 of 2013, financial terrorism would also be taken in by S. 15. It is also submitted that the amendment of S. 15 by Act 3 of 2013 is only clarificatory in nature.