VICTORIA XAVIER Vs. GREATER COCHIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The two revision petitions are coming up before us on a reference by a learned Single Judge. The question arising for decision can be formulated thus: In a case where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') are invoked for acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company, whether such local authority or company is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings pending before a court on a reference under S.18 of the Act by virtue of S.50(2) of the Act or under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(2.) Facts necessary for considering the question of law arising in the revisions can be stated thus: State of Kerala, the second respondent in both the revisions acquired certain properties belonging to the revision petitioners at the request of the Greater Cochin Development Authority (GCDA), the first respondent in the two revisions, for the purpose of its Town Planning Scheme. Admittedly GCDA is a local authority as defined under the Act. Dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded, petitioners sought for a reference under S.18 of the Act. Accordingly, two separate references were made to the Court which were numbered as L.A.RS. 274 and 275 of 1990 before the Additional Sub Judge, Cochin. In the above two reference cases, GCDA filed two interlocutory applications I.A. Nos. 1021 and 1507 of 1990 under S.50(2) of the Act and under S.151 of the C.P.C. with a prayer to implead it as an additional respondent in the two references. Revision petitioners alone opposed the prayer. After considering the objections raised by the petitioners, the learned Sub Judge overruled the objections and allowed the I.As. by a common order which is under challenge in these revisions.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri. T.V. Ananthan, submitted that in the scheme of the Act, the local authority or company at whose instance the acquisition proceedings are initiated by the Government under the Act (for short 'the beneficiary') has no locus standi to get impleaded in the proceedings either before the Collector or before the court. Such beneficiary is not a 'person interested' as defined under the Act. The dispute regarding the quantum of compensation which is the subject matter of the references under S.18 and 30 of the Act (corresponding to Ss.20 and 32 of the repealed Kerala Land Acquisition Act -See Moosa v. Special Tahsildar ( 1990 (2) KLT 887 ) are disputes between the owner of the land and the State or among the persons interested in receiving the compensation. No notice is contemplated to be given to the beneficiary of the acquisition in any of the proceedings under the Act. They are 'wayfarers' or 'man in the street' as they were described in Maru v. Premier Tyres Ltd. ( 1963 KLT 628 ) as far as the enquiry before the Collector and the court is concerned. The right of such beneficiary Under the Act is strictly confined to the right conferred on them under S.50(2) of the Act and no more. Neither the provisions under S.151, CPC nor O.1 R.10(2), CPC can be invoked by it for getting itself impleaded in the proceedings as an additional party. It has been consistently held by all the High Courts including this Court that the beneficiary cannot file an .appeal as of right and can file an appeal only after obtaining sanction for filing the same from the appellate court. The only right conferred on the beneficiary is to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation and as such it cannot be impleaded as an eo-nomine party to the proceedings or to submit pleadings or cross examine the witnesses or advance arguments in the proceedings as if it is a full fledged party to the proceedings. The principle underlying the provisions of the Act is that the Government is acquiring land on behalf and for the benefit of the beneficiary and State is expected to take care of the interest of the beneficiary and therefore, there is identity of interest between them. When State which is bound to protect the interest of the beneficiaries of the acquisition is party to the proceedings the beneficiary cannot also be allowed to be a party to the proceedings driving the claimants to the necessity of fighting the cause against two opponents at the same time. If beneficiary is also impleaded invoking O.1 R.10(2) CPC, that would in effect defeat the scheme of the provisions in the Act. S.53 of the Act makes the provisions of CPC applicable only in so far as they may not be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. S.50(2) is a provision inconsistent with O.1 R.10(2) CPC and as such O.1 R.10(2) CPC may not be available for the beneficiary to get impleaded in the proceedings. In support of the above propositions the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following decisions: Pramatha Nath v. Secy, of State ( AIR 1930 PC 64 ), Municipal Corpn, v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ): H.T. & M. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Francis AIR 1971 Bom, 341; AP. Agrl. University v. Mahmoodunnisa Begum (AIR 1976 A.P. 134); Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Umrao, AIR 1981 P & H 213; Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corpn. ( AIR 1986 SC 1164 ); M.P. State Coop. O.G. Federation v. State AIR 1987 M.P. 174); Neyveli Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Rangaswamy ( AIR 1990 Mad. 160 ); The Tamil Nadu Housing Board, v. Sangama Nadar ( AIR 1991 Mad. 20 ); Sakhigopal Regulated Market Committee v. Brundaban Chandra Hota ( AIR 1991 Ori. 252 ) and Gorakhpur Development Authority v. District Judge, Gorakhpur (AIR 1991 All. 241). Thus it was argued that the order under challenge whereby the first respondent is allowed to be impleaded as an additional party is illegal and liable to be set aside.