PADMANABHAN Vs. OUSEPH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) APPELLANT was the plaintiff in a suit for money with interest at 12% per annum. The trial court granted him a decree in terms of the plaint with future interest at 8 % per annum from the date of suit; but on appeal by the first defendant the lower appellate court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit with costs. On the memorandum of appeal in this Court the appellant paid court fee on the valuation in the lower appellate court which covered the principal amount and interest up to the date of the trial court decree but not on the interest up to the presentation of the second appeal. The appellant resisted, without assigning any reason, the direction of the office to pay court fee on this amount of interest in terms of Explanation. 3 to S. 52, court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Raveendran v. Appukkuttan,1981 KLT. 238. On his insistence the office has placed the matter before the Court. A learned single judge before whom the case came in the first instance has referred it to a Bench.

(2.) WE heard counsel for the appellant and the learned government Pleader.

(3.) DESPITE the language of the preamble that the object of the Act was "to amend and consolidate the law relating to court-fees and valuation of suits" the Act deals not only with court fees and valuation of suits but of appeals also, although "appeals" are not as such mentioned in the preamble. While it is permissible to the enacting part to outstrip the preamble, this result in the Act might be attributed to the well-known principle that "when an appeal is preferred from a decree of a court of First Instance, the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and reheard either in whole or in part, according as the whole suit is litigated again in the Court of Appeal or only a part of it. The final decree in the appeal will thus be the final decree in the suit, whether that be one confirming, varying or reversing the decree of the Court of First Instance When an appeal is preferred, the Court of Appeal is really seized of the whole suit though the relief given by it will be limited to the portion of the decree appealed against or objected to under S. 561, Civil procedure Code. " (Per Bhashyam Ayyangar J. in Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, ILR. XXVI Madras 91,95-96.) This decision and an earlier decision Pichuvayyangar v. Seshayyangar, ILR. 18 Madras 214 were followed and the same principle applied in Chinnakarupan Chetty v. Meyyappa Chetty, AIR 1916 Madras 732 where it was observed that ". . . the jurisdiction exercised by the Appellate court is with reference to the further stage of the suit which was disposed of by the first Court. "