RAMAN PILLAI THANKAPPAN PILLAI Vs. SPECIAL TAHSILDARLAND ACQUISITIONSCOLLECTORATEQUILON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Original Petition comes before us on a reference made by a learned Judge for deciding whether S.5, Limitation Act 1963 is applicable to an application under S.20, Kerala Land Acquisition Act.

(2.) The relevant facts which lie in a narrow compass can be shortly stated. 1.20 Ares of land with the buildings therein of which the petitioner was the owner was acquired by the State for widening the road from the Girls High School Junction to the Civil Station, Quilon. The 1st respondent who is the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, passed the relative award on 24-3-1976. The petitioner was served with notice of the award on 25-3-1976. On 10-5-1976 the petitioner who was dissatisfied with the compensation filed an application dated 9-5-1976 of which Ext. P2 is a copy before the 1st respondent under S.20(1), Land Acquisition Act requesting him to make a reference to the civil court. On 16-6-1976 the 1st respondent sent him a reply Ext. P3 rejecting the application on the ground that it was barred under S.20(2)(b) having been filed after the expiry of 6 weeks of the notice under S.12(2). The counter affidavit of the 1st respondent shows that on 26-6-1976 the petitioner made a second application requesting the 1st respondent to condone the delay and make the reference and that he followed it up by another application dated 12-10-1976 supported by a medical certificate before the Collector, Quilon. The counter affidavit states that to this the Ist respondent sent a reply that there was no provision to accept belated applications. The petitioner seeks to quash the communication Ext. P3.

(3.) In the course of the hearing before us counsel for the petitioner filed an affidavit that the original application for reference was made before the 1st respondent on 9-5-1976 and not on 10-5-1976. On this basis counsel sought to argue that the application was within time as the preceding two days, 7th and 8th were public holidays. But investigation disclosed that there were no such holidays and that the application was in fact filed before the 1st respondent only on 10-5-1976. The contention that the application was within time must therefore fail, apart from the fact that it is contrary to the basis of the Original Petition and even to the observation in the order of reference that the controversy about the date of filing of the application being a disputed question of fact could not be resolved in these proceedings.