MOHAMMED Vs. IALUK LAND BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS application is filed by the petitioner for condoning the delay in filing the revision petition against the order of the taluk Land Board, Thaliparamba in TLB. 114/76 dated 25-9-1979. The petitioner filed an application in Form No 6, Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules, seeking to set aside an order under S. 85 (5) of the Land Reforms Act passed by the Taluk Land board in TLB. 114/76. The arguments were heard in that petition on 19-6-1979 and the case was adjourned for orders. The date on which orders were to be pronounced was not fixed then or intimated later. The order was pronounced on 25-9-1979. The petitioner did not also get a copy of the order forwarded to him. On 2-11-1979 he sent a petition by registered post informing the Taluk land Board about the non-receipt of the copy of the order and requesting for a copy. The petitioner also made a request for a certified copy of the order and enclosed copying papers for the purpose. The petition was received by the Taluk land Board on 3-11-1979. But neither a copy of the order was served on him, nor was he given a certified copy. On 4-8-1981 the petitioner made enquiries at the taluk Land Board office and came to know that the application for copy stood dismissed. On a fresh application being filed a certified copy was granted to him on 11-3-1981. The petitioner filed the revision on 31-8-1981 along with the present petition for condoning the delay.

(2.) THE petition is opposed. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it is stated that there are no sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the State, a copy of the order dated 25-9-1979 was forwarded to the petitioner through the tahsildar, Thaliparamba on 16-10-1979. It is stated that no copy was supplied to him as per the request made in the first petition in as much as a copy had already been despatched to the petitioner through the Tahsildar, Thaliparamba.

(3.) R. 94 (3) which provides for the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining an attested copy of the order would suggest that the period of forty-five days should be reckoned from the date of the order. But in the absence of a provision regarding prior notice the affected party may not know when the order is pronounced. No doubt, even in the absence of a rule it is open to the Taluk Land Board to give prior notice of the date on which the order is to be pronounced; but there is no case for the respondent that any such practice exists. Absence of a provision similar to Order XX R. 1 of the code of Civil Procedure is a lacuna in the rules. It was under similar circumstances that the Supreme Court held in H. Chandra R. Singh v. Deputy Land acquisition Officer, AIR. 1961 SC 1500, and Madan Lal v. Stale of U. P. , AIR. 1975 SC. 2085, that the expression "date of the order" should mean the date on which the order was communicated to the party or the party aggrieved had the opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. The above decisions have been followed by me in Biyatta Attabi v. Muthukoya,1977 KLT. 50. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect in a recent case, Asst Transport commissioner v. Nandsingh, AIR. 1980 SC. 15, arising under the U. P. Transport taxation Act. The respondent in that case moved for exemption of tax in respect of his motor vehicle for a certain period. An appeal against the order was to be filed within 30 days of the order. The letter communicating the order was dated October 20/24,1964. The respondent received the order on October 29, 1964. If the period of 30 days was to commence from 24th October, the appeal was beyond time; but it was within time if the period was to start from 29th October The High Court followed the decision in Chandra R. Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR. 1961 SC. 1500, and held that the appeal was within time. The Supreme Court observed: "it is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the Office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructi -vely in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order In a given case the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. " The above reasoning applies in the instant case.