LAWS(KER)-1982-6-19

ALEYAMMA Vs. DY DIRECTOR EDUCATION

Decided On June 15, 1982
ALEYAMMA Appellant
V/S
DY. DIRECTOR, EDUCATION Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is a High School Assistant. She challenges Ext. P-4 order of the Deputy Director, Education, Ernakulam (the 1st respondent) stating: "the higher scale of pay sanctioned to the teacher may be revised accordingly and the excess pay drawn may be got refunded. " the higher scale of pay was sanctioned by the District Educational Officer, muvattupuzha (the 2nd respondent) in favour of the petitioner by Ext. P-1 order which came into effect on 28th January 1973. THE scale was granted with reference to R. 2 of Chap. 26 of the Kerala Education Rules on the basis of the total service rendered by the petitioner. By Ext. P-3 dated 27th October 1980 the 2nd respondent forwarded to the petitioner's Headmaster a copy of Ext. P-4 letter in which there was a direction to recover the excess payment said to have been made to the petitioner. On the basis of Exts. P-3 and P-4 the headmaster sent Ext. P-2 letter dated 8th December 1980 to the petitioner calling upon her to refund the excess amounts received by her on the basis of the fixation of her pay in the higher grade as per Ext. P-1 with effect from 28th january 1973. In other words it has been found by Ext. P-4 that Ext P-1 was wrongly made by the 2nd respondent insofar as the petitioner was given credit for certain periods of broken service on the basis of which she was placed on the higher scale of pay. THE question is whether the petitioner is liable to be compelled to refund the amounts received by her in terms of Ext. P-1.

(2.) CERTAIN dates are relevant for the consideration of the question. The petitioner was appointed by the St. Paul 's High School, Veliyanad as a High school Assistant on 5th October 1960. When the school closed for summer vacation on 29th March 1961 she was relieved from the service of the school in terms of rule 49 of Chap. 14a of the Kerala Education Rules. She was re-appointed when the school reopened on 5th June 1961. According to the petitioner she left the school on 29th July 1961 to join the Training College on her selection by the University authorities for training. However it is seen in the service record that she had actually resigned. The petitioner states in the O. P. that that entry was wrongly made and that she had not resigned. (This is a controversy which it is unnecessary for me to consider in the present proceeding.) The training commenced on 1st August 1961 and ended on 18th April 1962 which was during the summer vacation. When the schools reopened she was appointed in St. Mary's High School, Pothanicad, with effect from 6th June 1962. Shortly thereafter the result of the training course was published on 18th June 1962. The petitioner had passed and obtained the degree of B. Ed. Ext. P-1 was made with reference to these dates. The relevant portion of that order reads: "13. Remarks.- Broken periods of service from 5th october 1960 to 29th March 1961 and from 5th June 1961 to 29th July 1961 and the B. Ed. training period from 1st August 1961 to 18th April 1962 have also been counted for calculation of twelve years service for sanction of Higher scale as per G. O. (Ms) 62/73/s/edn. , dated 2nd May 1973. Certified that the details of continuous service reckoned for fixation of pay of the teacher in the Higher scale of pay have been personally verified by me with reference to relevant records including the service book and found correct. Table:#1 Eligible for higher scale of pay from 28th January 1973 f. N. "

(3.) TO be called upon to refund amounts paid in terms of an order made by a competent officer, particularly after the lapse of several years, not only causes hardship, but it is in principle unjust and wrong. Every person has a right to place his trust in orders made by a competent authority in the normal exercise of his jurisdiction, unless, of course, the order is vitiated by fraud or interests in favour of third parties are adversely affected. Ext. P-1 was bona fide made by a competent officer. The Government have no case that it was not so made. The petitioner did not supply any wrong information on the basis of which the officer was misled. The Government have no such case. Both parties have acted bona fide at all material times. The order was passed on the basis of a Government order which, as I stated earlier, was on the face of it rationally and reasonably relied upon by the officer.