(1.) The debtor, the defendant, who lost before both the lower courts , is the appellant and the creditor, the plaintiff, the respondent. The appellant claimed relief under Kerala Act 11 of 1970; but the same was refused by both the lower courts, which held that the debt concerned was one coming within the exclusion contained in , clause (f) of sub-s.(4) of S.2 of the Act, viz., a debt which represented the price of goods purchased for the purpose of trade. When the second appeal came for hearing before a Single Judge, three decisions of this Court were brought to his notice, viz., Ulahannan Alexander v. Kuruvila (Thachara) & Co. ( 1963 KLT 8 ) by one of us sitting single, Lukka John v. Popular Automobiles ( 1965 KLT 553 ) by a Division Bench and Souri Varghese v. P. C. Assankutty ( 1971 KLT 642 ) by another Single Judge. In the first two decisions, which were on the same lines, it was held that the debts concerned were not debts coming within the mischief of the exclusion referred to above, while the third decision distinguished the aforesaid two decisions and held that the debt concerned came within the exclusion. The Single Judge before whom the second appeal originally came appears to have thought that the three cases were alike and that the third case should not have been distinguished.
(2.) In the first case, viz., Ulahannan Alexander's case, the debt represented the price of oil purchased for use in the machinery in a mill and the engine attached to a pump set in the mill. What was meant by "trade" and "tradesman" was discussed in that case; and it was observed that "trade" in its primary sense meant buying and selling. It was also observed that "goods" meant merchandise and "goods purchased for the purpose of trade" meant merchandise or commodities purchased for sale. Ultimately, it was held in that case that, since the oil purchased was not such "merchandise" or "goods" purchased for the purpose of sale, the exclusion did not apply. In the case before the Division Bench, viz., Lukka John's case, the articles purchased were spare parts for a transport vehicle. The Division Bench approved the decision in Ulahannan Alexander's case and held that the spare parts purchased were not articles or commodities purchased for sale - for the purpose of trade. In the third case, viz., Souri Varghese's case, the article purchased was copra, which was converted into oil and oil cake and sold. The learned Judge distinguished (rightly too) the earlier two decisions, wherein the articles purchased were not sold in any form whatsoever, while the commodity purchased in the third case, viz., copra, was converted into oil and oil cake and sold. The learned Judge pointed out that, in the case before him, the commodity purchased was for sale, though not in the same form, unlike the other two cases, where the articles purchased were not for sale in any form.
(3.) In the case before us too, the commodity purchased was soaked husk, which was evidently not intended for any purpose like domestic use, but must have been for converting into coconut fibre and then into coir mat and then sold. The commodity, soaked husk, was thus converted into coconut fibre and further into coir mat and then sold: evidently, the purchase was for the purpose of sale or trade. This is therefore a case which comes within Souri Varghese's case, the third case mentioned above, and not within the other two decisions. We also point out that all the three decisions mentioned above are correct.