KOTTEKADAN MOHAMMED HAJI Vs. POOZHIKKUTATHU ABUBAKER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE petitions raise a common question and we dispose of the same by a common judgment. Shortly stated, the question is whether the additional Munsiff, Manjeri who disposed of an application under the Kerala buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the act), had jurisdiction to dispose of that application and whether the subordinate Judge, Manjeri who heard the appeal from the decision of the additional Munsiff, Manjeri, on the appeals preferred by the landlords from the decision of the Additional Munsiff, Manjeri, before the Subordinate Judge, kozhikode, the appeals having been transferred by that judge to the Subordinate judge's Court, Manjeri, had also jurisdiction. There is a decision of this court in Beera Koya v. Ali Koya reported in 1972 KLT. 86 which concludes the matter against the petitioners before us who are tenants. The correctness of this decision rendered by a single judge of this Court has been challenged and the case has therefore been referred to the Division Bench and it is argued by counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the decision in Beera Koya v. Ali koya has no application.

(2.) THE bare facts necessary for the disposal of these revision petitions are the following: THE Revision Petitioners are tenants who are governed by the Act. THE respondents to these petitions sought eviction of the Revision Petitioners by moving the Munsiff, Manjeri under S. 11 of the Act on two counts; (1) that the buildings in question were required for the bona fide use of the respondents-landlords and (2) that there have been arrears of rent. After the applications were moved before the Munsiff, Manjeri, an additional Munsiff was appointed to Manjeri and the Munsiff before whom the applications were moved transferred those applications to the Additional munsiff and it was the Additional Munsiff who disposed of the applications. He held that the ground of bona fide use alleged by the landlords was not made out. Regarding the arrears of rent he permitted the tenants to pay the arrears within the time stipulated. THE Landlords appealed, and it is admitted that the appeal was before the appropriate and competent authority, namely, the Sub judge, Kozhikode, from the decision of the Additional Munsiff, Manjeri. Consequent on the formation of a new district in Manjeri, a Subordinate Judge's court was also constituted in that area and the Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode, transferred the appeals preferred before him by the respondents to the subordinate Judge, Manjeri, who heard and allowed the appeals holding that the landlords required the buildings for their bona fide use and occupation. THE revision Petitioners before us then applied for revision of the decision of the subordinate Judge, Manjeri, before the District Judge, Manjeri, and one of the contentions that was raised before the District Judge was that neither the additional Munsiff, Manjeri, nor the Subordinate Judge, Manjeri, had any jurisdiction to deal with the applications for eviction and the appeals respectively. This contention has been negatived by the District Judge but it is repeated before us in these Revision Petitions.

(3.) THE buildings in question are admittedly situate within the Manjeri Panchayat and therefore the Munsiff or Munsiffs of Manjeri according to the notification will have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. THE contention raised by counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that only a single Munsiff in an area has been conferred with jurisdiction by the notification and that if there were more than one Munsiff in an area, both the munsiffs will not get jurisdiction to deal with a matter coming within the Act functioning as a "rent Control Court". In support of this argument it was asserted before us, and perhaps rightly we are not certain whether this is the position that the notification itself provided inherent evidence that the intent was only to confer jurisdiction on a single Munsiff in an area. Our attention was invited to the Trivandrum and Quilon districts so far as the munsiffs of Trivandrum and Quilon are concerned where it is specifically mentioned that the Munsiff in question is the Principal Munsiff and of the ernakulam Munsiff under the Ernakulam district where it is mentioned that the munsiff who is to function as the "rent Control Court" is the additional Munsiff. THE assertion is that in every area where there were more than one Munsiff functioning, one as the Principal Munsiff and the other as the additional Munsiff or Munsiffs, the notification took care to mention either the Principal or the Additional Munsiff to function as the "rent Control court". As we said, this may or may not be so, but we are not able to posit that it was so in the absence of material. We have therefore to construe the ambit and scope of the notification with reference to the plain meaning of the language used in the notification. THE preamble to the notification which we have read in extenso used the words "hereby appoint the Munsiffs specified in column (1)". Column (1) starts with the heading "munsiffs" and thereafter the different areas are mentioned. In certain cases, as we pointed out, there is specific mention of a 'principal Munsiff' or 'additional munsiff'. In other areas like Manjeri, nothing is mentioned. If the plural of munsiffs employed both in the preamble as well as in the heading to column (1)of the Schedule should apply to every area mentioned in the Schedule, then all munsiffs in an area, for instance, at Manjeri, are conferred with jurisdiction as "rent Control Courts". THEre is no violence to the language in so reading the notification. In fact, we are inclined to thick that a normal grammatical reading of the notification justifies only such an interpretation. That being so, we have to conclude that if there were more than one Munsiffs in the Manjeri area for the Manjeri Panchayat, both those Munsiffs will get jurisdiction and would become "rent Control Courts" within the meaning of that expression as defined in S. 2 (5) of the Act. Counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan reported in 1968 KLT. 8 and has urged that we should not reach this conclusion since such a conclusion will be against the decision in that case. We have therefore to examine what was decided in the full Bench case. THE section that came up for construction in Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan was about the scope and ambit of the expression "the subordinate Judge" occurring in S. 102 of the Land Reforms Act. THE paragraph of the judgment which has been mainly relied on by counsel on behalf of the petitioners is Para. 6 of that judgment. We shall read that paragraph: "6. S. 12 (2) of the Interpretation and General clauses Act, 1125, provides that, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. THE words "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" preclude the application of the provision to S. 102 of the Act. If the words "the Subordinate Judges" are substituted for the words "the Subordinate Judge" in the section, a result that is absurd will follow. Sub-section (1) will then read as follows: "any person aggrieved by the orders of the Land tribunal under S. 31 may appeal against such order within such time as may be prescribed to the Subordinate Judges having jurisdiction over the area in which the holding or part thereof is situate-THEy shall hear the appeal as personae designatae and their decision thereof shall be final. subject to the provisions of S. 103. " This will mean that every appeal under S. 102 will have to be heard and decided by all the judges of the court concerned. Such a procedure could not possibly have been intended by any legislature. " It is clear from the paragraph that what is stated therein has been said in answer to the contention urged by counsel that the expression that'the Subordinate Judge' used in S. 102 of the Land Reforms Act must be read as the 'subordinate Judges' in view of S. 12 (2) of the interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125. This Court observed that S. 12 (2)of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, will apply only when there is nothing repugnant to the subject or context in so reading and it also came to the conclusion on interpreting S. 102 of the Land Reforms Act that to read 'the Subordinate Judges' for the expression 'the Subordinate Judge' would be repugnant to the subject and context. In the case before us, we have not been asked to rely on any provision under the Interpretation and General Clauses act, 1125, but what is urged by counsel for the respondents before us is that we should read the notification in the ordinary manner and according to its simple language. Since we have not got to press into aid any of the enabling provisions of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, in giving the extended meaning used in the notification in question, we do not think the ruling in the Full Bench in Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan reported in 1968 KLT. 8 can govern the matter before us. Having come to the conclusion that the expression under S 102 of the Land Reforms Act can apply only to a single subordinate Judge, the further question as to who that Subordinate Judge could be was considered in Para. 11 of the judgment with reference to the provisions of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957, and the view was taken that "the subordinate Judge" in S. 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, means the Subordinate Judge when there is only one judge attached to a Subordinate judge's Court and the Principal Subordinate Judge when there are more than one subordinate Judges attached to such a court. " We do not think that this ruling can have any application. If the ruling has no application we have to take it that both the Munsiffs at Manjari are "rent Control Courts" who were competent to deal with the applications under the Act. Even so it was urged with reference to R. 14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)Rules, 1959, that the Munsiff before whom the applications had been made had no jurisdiction and is incompetent to transfer the application to the Additional munsiff, Manjeri, and therefore the Additional Munsiff, Manjeri, will not get any jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Rule 14 is in these terms: "an appellate authority may transfer a case from the file of one Rent Control Court to that of another Rent Control Court within his jurisdiction (i) if the Rent Control Court on whose file the case is pending is personally interested in it and reports the matter to the Appellate authority or, (ii) if, on an application for transfer by any party in the case, the Appellate Authority is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for the transfer. " No doubt, R. 14 gives power only to an appellate authority to transfer a case from one Rent Control Court to another and for the reasons mentioned therein. This rule gives power to the appellate authority to transfer a case from one Rent Control Court that had jurisdiction to deal with the matter to another Rent Control Court which but for the transfer would have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In other words, it is the order passed under R. 14 by the appellate authority which gives jurisdiction to the transferee Rent Control Court to deal with the matter. This rule cannot govern a case where the Rent Control Court to which a transfer had been made though not under any of the specific provisions of the rules had inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter as we think, the Manjeri Additional Munsiff being also a Rent Control Court under the notification. In such cases, we are of the view that the principle of the decision in Merla Ramanna v. Nallaparaju and others reported in AIR. 1956 SC. 87 must govern the matter. A suit to set aside a decree passed by another court was instituted in the court within which the subject matter of the suit was transferred after the first decree was passed. This suit, it was held could be only treated as an application under S. 47, cpc. , and the further contention urged that such an application could be moved only in the court which passed the decree or the court to which a decree had been transferred under S. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, their Lordships said that when the court in which a suit has been instituted (which suit had been treated as an application under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure) had inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter the decision of that court on that application is not void or even invalid. Applying the principles of that decision, however irregular the order of transfer by the Munsiff, Manjeri before whom the application was made was, we do not hold that it is irregular but assuming it is so it cannot deprive the jurisdiction of the Additional munsiff who had, as we have said, become a 'rent Control Court' under the Act. THE decision of the Additional Munsiff is therefore competent and on the same reasoning we have to hold that the Subordinate Judge of Manjeri to whom the cases have been transferred by Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode also had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. THE notification which conferred jurisdiction on the Subordinate Judge in fact, is clear on this aspect and we shall read that notification: "in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a)of sub-s. (1) of S. 18 of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act 16 of 1959) and in supersession of all previous notifications on subject, the Government of Kerala hereby confer on the Subordinate Judges or the principal Subordinate judges, as the case may be, of the Subordinate Judge's courts having jurisdiction over the areas in which the building is situate, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the said Act. "