C A PARVATHY AMMAL Vs. K C CHAKUNNY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, who is the landlord, applied to the Rent Control Court under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, or the 1950 Order for short, for evicting the respondent tenant from her building on the ground that rent had been allowed to fall into arrears. That court ordered eviction by Ext. P-1 on October 27, 1958. The respondent applied for a copy of Ext. P-1 for preferring an appeal. Before the period for preferring it expired, the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance, 1959, or the Ordinance for short, came into force on January 17, 1959. Under S.18 of the Ordinance, the appellate authority in respect of the decision of a Rent Control Court constituted thereunder is the Subordinate Judge, while under the 1950 Order such authority was the Collector. The respondent filed the appeal against Ext. P-1 on February 7, 1959, before the Subordinate Judge by virtue of the Ordinance. He prayed for setting aside Ext. P-1 on depositing before the appellate authority the arrears of rent accrued with interest and the costs of proceedings in purported pursuance of S.11 (2) (b) of the Ordinance. He had no such right under the 1950 Order. Overruling the objections raised by the petitioner Ext. P-1 was set aside by the order Ext. P-2, dated July 7, 1959. It may be mentioned, that the Ordinance had been replaced by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Bent Control) Act, 1959, which came into force on April 3, 1959, but this is not material for the present purpose. The petitioner took Ext. P-2 in revision to the District Judge who confirmed it by his order Ext. P-3, dated January 30, 1960. This writ petition is to quash both Exts. P-2 and P-3.

(2.) The chief ground urged in support of the petition was that the proceedings for eviction instituted under the 1950 Order, ceased to be pending by the passing of Ext. P-1 before the Ordinance came into force and therefore S.30 of the latter could not have been availed of by the respondent for preferring the appeal to the Subordinate Judge under S.18 aforesaid. This will depend on the interpretation of the term pending in S.30, sub-section (1) of the Ordinance which may be extracted:

(3.) According to the respondent the period for preferring the appeal not having expired on the date the Ordinance came into force and an appeal having in fact been filed, Ext. P1 did not amount to a final disposal of the eviction proceedings which must therefore be deemed to be pending at the material time. S.18 (6) of the Ordinance, which reads: