NARAYANAN PILLAI RAMAN PILLAI Vs. GODAVARMA VALIYA RAJA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The executability of the decree obtained by the plaintiff in this case is the question raised by the appellants who are the legal representatives of the 1st defendant. The properties involved in this case are situated within the Poonjar Idavaka and they were demised on lease from the Idavaka to the defendants in the case. The dues payable to the Idavaka by the tenants fell into arrears and the present decree was obtained by the Chief of the Idavaka for recovery of such arrears for the period from 1095 to 1101, from the defendants and as a charge on the value of their improvements in the suit properties. On 22.3.1115 the Idavaka Chief issued a Proclamation remitting in favour of the tenants the arrears of tax due from them up to the close of the year 1108. Ext. 1 is copy of that Proclamation. When the plaintiff decree holder took out execution for bringing the suit properties to sale for realising the decree amount, the 1st defendant raised the objection that in view of Ext. 1 Proclamation the decree holder is not entitled to proceed with the execution of the decree. That objection was overruled by the executing Court and hence this appeal.

(2.) The decree as it stands, is an executable decree. The question for consideration is whether the Proclamation Ext. 1 has the effect of superseding this decree or whether it amounts to an adjustment and satisfaction recognisable by the executing Court. The position of the Chief of the Poonjar Idavaka, who is the plaintiff decree holder in this case, is only that of a feudal landlord. He has no sovereign powers and hence the Proclamation Ext. 1 issued by him cannot have any legislative sanction attached to it just as in the case of a Proclamation or Ordinance issued by a sovereign authority. It is only a unilateral declaration by the Chief stating that he was giving up in favour of the tenants under him the right to recover the arrears of tax due from them up to the end of the year 1108. Such a declaration by itself cannot have the effect of extinguishing or superseding the decrees passed by Civil Courts for the recovery of such dues. The Courts are not bound to take cognisance of such declarations and to give effect to them. The best that can be said in favour of such a declaration is that it amounts to an adjustment and satisfaction of the decree as contemplated by O.21 R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3.) But in order that the executing Court may give effect to such an adjustment and satisfaction, the same must have been certified by the decree holder or the judgment debtor must have applied to the executing Court within the period prescribed by law to have such adjustment and satisfaction recorded as certified. In the present instance the decree holder has not certified in the execution Court that the decree has been adjusted and satisfied. On the other hand, he is maintaining that there was no such adjustment and satisfaction in respect of the decree in this case and that the Proclamation Ext. 1 was not intended to cover claims for which decrees had already been obtained. The judgment debtors did not also care to apply to the executing Court to have the alleged adjustment and satisfaction of the decree recorded as certified within the time prescribed by law, i.e. within 90 days from the date of adjustment and satisfaction as prescribed by Art.174 of the Limitation Act. The contention that there has been an adjustment and satisfaction of the decree by virtue of the Proclamation Ext. 1, has been put forward by the 1st defendant for the first time before the execution court only on 12.8.1118 when he filed his objections to the execution of the decree. Such a belated contention cannot be recognised by the executing Court and the provision to that effect contained in Cl. (3) of R.2 of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory. To get over the effect of this provision, it was argued by the learned advocate for the appellants that Ext. 1 did not really amount to an adjustment and satisfaction of the decree as contemplated by O.21, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that it was an agreement between the Chief of the Poonjar Idavaka and the defendants in this case that the claim against them will not be enforced. Ext. 1 on the face of it does not lend support to this contention. As already stated, Ext. 1 contains only a unilateral declaration by the Idavaka Chief and as such it cannot be said that it amounts to an agreement between the Chief and his tenants. The judgment debtors cannot put forward Ext. I, even as an agreement, as a bar to the execution of the decree. The decree is a valid decree and so long as it remains in force, the executing Court is bound to enforce it unless it is shown that the right to execute the same has become barred by limitation or that there has been an adjustment and satisfaction of the decree. There is no contention in this case that the decree has become barred by limitation. Even construing Ext. 1 as amounting to an adjustment and satisfaction of the claim under this decree also, it is seen that there has been no certification or recording of such adjustment and satisfaction as required by the provisions of O.21, R.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot also be said that Ext. 1 operates as an estoppel against the decree holders right to execute the decree. The right to execute the decree is controlled by the provisions of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there can be no estoppel against the right conferred by such statutory provisions. There is no scope for the judgment debtors to avail of such a plea of limitation on the basis of an adjustment and satisfaction not recorded or certified as required by the Code. Thus in any view of the case it is clear that the objections to the executability of the decree in this case are unsustainable. The lower court was therefore right in overruling those objections. In this view of the matter, the points raised in the objection memorandum filed on behalf of the decree holder respondent do not arise for consideration.