GOVINDAN NAIR BALAKRISHNAN NAIR Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short point for decision in this Original Petition is whether a proceeding initiated under the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be proceeded with after the expiration of the period mentioned in the preliminary order. On 25. 8. 1124, the First Class Magistrate of Meenachil initiated proceedings under Section 103 of the Travancore Criminal Procedure Code (Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act V of 1898) against the petitioner and 12 others to show cause why they should not be bound down to maintain the peace for a period of one year. The notice of, the preliminary order was issued on 23. 10. 1124 and 4. 11. 1124 was the date fixed for the appearance of the parties. The preliminary order or the notice did not specify when the period of one year was to commence. It would appear that in a revision filed against an interim order for security passed under Section 117 (Section 113 in Travancore Code) the proceedings remained stayed from Mithunam 1124 till Meenam 1126 and when the enquiry was re-started after the interim order was vacated in revision the petitioner filed this original petition to quash the proceedings before the Magistrate on the ground that by reason of the expiry of 'one year' the Magistrate had ceased to have competence or jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.

(2.) WE are afraid there is no substance in this petition. Though decided cases on the point are few, Section 120 (Travancore Section 116) is decisive of the point. That section enacts as follows:

(3.) AS mentioned already, the preliminary order did not say when the one year period was to commence and when that happens to be so Courts are bound to give effect to the above statutory provision. The opposite view that the period should run from the date of the preliminary order or the notice is frought with mischievous consequences. A decision of Wallace, J. reported in re : Taranagowd 51 Mad. 515 has if we say so with respect, clearly explained the true position. In that case, the final order was passed within the period mentioned in the preliminary order and called upon the counter-petitioners therein to furnish security for the period specified in the preliminary order commencing with the final order. It was contended in revision that the court had no jurisdiction to pass such an order. The preliminary order was passed on 4th January 1926 and that called upon the counter-petitioners to show cause against giving security to keep the peace for one year. The contention raised in revision before the High Court was that it was not open to the trial court to order security for more than one year from the date of the preliminary order, that is, at the farthest, up to the 4th January 1927. The learned Judge repelled the contention in the following words: