VENUGOPALAN Vs. MANJERY MUNICIPALITY MANJERY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner has filed this Writ Petition challenging Ext.P4 proceedings of the 2nd respondent rejecting his application for permission to construct a commercial- cum-residential building complex in his property. His application has been rejected for the reason that the property is described as 'nilam' in the possession certificate of the petitioner.

(2.) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the ground on which Ext.P4 has been issued is unsustainable. The case of the petitioner is that though the property has been described as paddy field in his possession certificate, at present the same is remaining as a house plot or filled up land. The above is evident from Ext.P2 photographs. Therefore, he seeks the issue of appropriate orders setting aside Ext.P4.

(3.) HAVING considered the rival contentions of the contesting parties, it has to be held that Ext.P4 is unsustainable in view of the dictum laid down by the apex court in Raju S.Jethmalani and others v. State of Maharashtra and others [(2005) 11 SCC 222]. It has been held by this Court that it is not the description of a land in the title deed that is decisive, but the present condition of the land. If the land has ceased to be a paddy field on the date of coming into force of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008, the building permit cannot be denied. A perusal of Ext.P4 shows that the above aspect has not been considered. Therefore, Ext.P4 is set aside. This Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of directing the 2nd respondent to consider the application submitted by the petitioner afresh, after conducting an inspection of the land of the petitioner to verify whether the land continues to be a paddy field as described in the possession certificate of the petitioner and whether the conversion was made before 2008 and thereafter, to pass appropriate orders on the application in accordance with law. Appropriate orders as indicated above shall be passed, as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of one month of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.