GARY NARESH RAJAN Vs. RADHA RAJAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Ext. P-4 order passed by the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram that it has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code"), which has been disputed by the petitioner/respondent in that proceeding, is challenged in this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The case in hand reflects a sad state of affairs, a fight between a mother and son. Petitioner in the MC is the mother, who claimed maintenance against her son, who is stated to be settled in Chennai. He has raised a preliminary objection questioning the territorial jurisdiction of the court contending that the claim for maintenance, if at all entertainable by the mother, would lie only at Chennai, where he resides, and not before the Family Court, at Thiruvananthapuram. That challenge, pursuant to the directions issued in Ext. P-1 order by this court in a previous petition was considered as a preliminary question by the court below. Though the objection canvassed by the son in the light of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Vijaya Kumar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2004 2 KerLT 435 was found having force and merit, the learned Judge taking a view that even if the petition is not maintainable under Section 125 of the Code, still the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim as one arising in a petition under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short "the Act"). Statutory right of the mother enshrined under Section 20 of the Act to claim maintenance against the son can be enforced in the proceedings initiated under Section 125 of the Code canvassed by the counsel for the mother, was accepted by the learned Judge, Family Court to hold that the claim for maintenance could be reckoned and treated as one filed under Section 20 of the Act, read with Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. Taking such a view, the petition filed to claim maintenance was found entertainable and challenge against the jurisdiction canvassed by the son/ respondent in the proceeding was turned down. Ext. P-4 order so passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, is challenged in the petition.

(2.) I heard the counsel on both sides.

(3.) A claim for maintenance by a parent against the son under Section 125 of the Code would lie only at the place where the son from whom such claim is sought to be reinforced resides is not a matter of dispute in the present proceedings. The Apex Court in Vijayakumar Prasad's case(1) has clearly stated that the parents cannot be placed on the same pedestal as that of the wife and children for the purpose of Section 126 of the Code, which governs the jurisdiction in entertaining a proceeding thereof. Clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 126, it has been held, enable only the wife and children under Section 125 of the Code, and in determining the jurisdiction so far as the claim by parents against their children Clause (a) in the aforesaid sub-section alone is applicable. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Dawalsab v. Khajasab, 2009 14 SCC 660. In fact, the learned Judge, Family Court, taking note of the decision rendered in Vijayakumar Prasad's ease has also reached the conclusion that a claim under Section 125 of the Code by the mother against the son would lie only at the place where the son resides. However, objection raised over the jurisdiction by the son against the proceedings has been turned down accepting the case canvassed by the counsel for the mother that since she has got a statutory right to claim maintenance against her son under Section 20 of the Act, such a claim could be entertained by the Family Court in its jurisdiction under Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. View taken by the court below to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain the claim is patently erroneous and unsustainable. No doubt, if a claim is made under Section 20 of the Act in which not only future maintenance but past maintenance as well could be canvassed for, the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate such claim. But that does not confer any authority on the Family Court to convert a petition filed under Section 125 of the Code as a claim under a different statute and, then, proceed with the adjudication of the claim. What is recognised under Section 125 of the Code is a legal right conferred on neglected wife, children and parents irrespective of their right conferred under the personal law, to claim maintenance from those who are bound to maintain them provided they are unable to maintain themselves. Under the personal law of the parties, whether it be statutory or otherwise, an obligation has been cast upon the person from whom the claim sought for does not enable the Family Court to convert a proceeding filed under Section 125 of the Code as a claim otherwise entertainable where such proceedings are challenged impeaching its territorial jurisdiction to entertain such claim. The question to be considered then is whether it has territorial jurisdiction to entertain such claim with reference to Section 126 of the Code. If it is shown that the proceedings initiated under Section 125 of the Code do not satisfy the jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding under Section 126 of the Code, the court has no other option but to return the petition for presentation before the court having jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act does not confer any jurisdiction on the Family Court to convert a proceeding commenced under the Code as a proceeding entertainable as a civil suit or proceeding. If a claim for maintenance is made by the mother against the son in a civil suit or proceeding before the Family Court, no doubt, it can entertain and adjudicate that claim. But a proceeding already commenced under Section 125 of the Code, the jurisdiction of which is governed by Section 126 of the Code, cannot be converted and treated as a suit or proceeding on the premise that the mother has a statutory right to claim maintenance against the son and as such, the proceeding could be treated as a civil suit maintainable before the Family Court. In relation to suit and proceeding under Section 7(1) the Family Courts Act, the Family Court is exercising the powers of a civil court and in respect of any proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code, what it exercises is only the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate, evidently has been lost sight of by the learned Judge, Family Court when he passed Ext. P-4 order.