ELIZABETH Vs. FRANCIS EDWIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Our learned and noble Brother T. L. Viswanatha Iyer felt some doubt as to the semantics, the drift tenor and impact of S.52 and its provisos of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). S.52 of the Act provides for payment of court fee for appeals. For easy understanding of the relevancy of the question, we quote S.52 of the Act:

(2.) The question forth rightly posed before us by Justice T. L. Viswanatha Iyer is as to this Court's confines of power and jurisdiction to extend the time for remitting the 2/3rds of the court fee payable after the admission of appeals. Petitioner contended ' that this Court has got power to extend the time beyond the period of thirty days if there are sufficient cause shown for entitling the petitioner for an extension of time to pay the balance court fee. We issued notice to the Advocate General. Government Pleader appeared before us and submitted that the view of the Government is that Court's power is not absolutely restricted to extend the time after the first stage to 30 days only.

(3.) The question was elaborately argued by counsel appearing in these cases. Being a matter which would form the practice of the courts and would be of great importance in so far as this question will crop up every day in the functioning of the court, we feel that we must deal with the question a little elaborately. Though these are petitions concerning extension of time for payment of balance court fee really before us what we see is the entire litigant public in an interpretative polemics. The State is not competing the claim of the petitioners herein, but only aiding the court to interpret the provision in a meaningful, purposive and pragmatic manner so as to ensure the provision capable of granting a relief logically and legitimately entitled to blameless 'sansreproche' litigants before court. Taking this view of the matter, the Government Pleader very frankly and forth rightly submitted that this Court's power is not totally curtailed to the outer limit of 30 days in the matter of extension of time for payment of balance court fee. It was said that it will not promote justice and it will cause failure of the prime devoir behind the scheme of the amendment that was brought out after considerable deliberation over the report of a committee chaired by a former Chief Justice of this Court on the question of the proper levy of court fee. There was a steady and chorus brawl for reducing the court fee payable by the litigant public. The question of quid pro quo and other ancillary and relevant aspects touching the dispensation of justice and the relevance of levying court fee were considered in two far famed significant and lofty decisions of the Supreme Court; AIR 1989 SC 100 (P. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka) and AIR 1973 S.C. 724 (Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department v. Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd.).' A thorough discussion by the eminent Judges shed a volume of clear light on the different shades of the question how to levy court fee when a suitor comes with his paramount civil right to get relief either from the State or from his fellow citizens from an established court.