PHASILA Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short question that arises foe consideration is whether an accused who is tainted and sentenced under the Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act, S5 (for short 'the N. D. P. S. act) other than under s. 27 is entitled to suspension of intense pending appeal.

(2.) CONTENTION of the petitioners is that under S. 389 of the Code of Criminal judiciary this Court has wide powers to suspend the sentence under the N. D. P. S. Act ring the pendency of the appeal not-withstanding S. 32-A of the Act. S. 389 (1) wades that pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for icons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order pealed against be suspended and, also if he is in confinement, that he may be released bail or on his own bond. Counsel pointed out that S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act has no placation to a case where the accused has already been convicted and when he files appeal and moves for suspension of the sentence. S. 37 (1) (b) postulates notice to : Public Prosecutor on any motion for bail. S. 37 (1) (b) (ii) provides that after giving twice to the Public Prosecutor bail can be granted if Court is satisfied that there are stainable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that s not likely to commit any offence while on bail. S. 37 contains a non-obstante clause the effect that it overrides the provisions for bai! under the Cr. P. C. In Narcotics enroll Bureau v. Kishan Lai (1991 (1) K. L. T. 547) the Supreme Court held that the savers to grant bail under S. 439 are subject to the limitations contained in the amended 7 of the n. D. P. S. Act and restrictions on the powers of the Court under the said Section applicable to the High Court also in the matter of granting bail. There cannot be any but that S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act is not applicable to case where an accused has already ai convicted and when he files appeal and seeks suspension of the sentence.

(3.) FROM a reading of S. 32-A of the N. D. P. S. Act it is not possible to hold that the interdict regarding suspension of the sentence is confined only to the Government and not to the appellate Court. The section does not confine its ambit to the suspension of sentence by the Government. The section does not make any distinction between the suspension of sentence by the appellate Court and the Government. Of course, appellate Court's power of suspension of sentence is limited to a case where the convicted accused has filed appeal. Suspension of sentence by the appellate Court can only be till the appeal is disposed of whereas suspension of sentence by the Government is not thus limited. Except that difference S. 32-A does not indicate of any difference regarding suspension of sentence by the appellate Court or the government. The argument that S. 32-A has no application to the power of the appellate Court regarding suspension of sentence cannot be accepted. It is the well settled legal principle that words, phrases and sentences of a statute should ordinarily be understood in their natural, ordinary, popular and grammatical meaning unless it would lead to an absurd result or the object of the statute indicates a totally different meaning. Even if two interpretations are possible, the one which fits in with the object of the statute has to be adopted. As held by the Supreme Court in Vijayawada Municipal Council v. A. P. S. E. Board (1976-4-S. CC. 548) the salutary rule of construction rests upon the doctrine that a statute like any other document, must be read as a whole to extract its meaning and intendment correctly. If S. 32-A is held applicable only to suspension of sentence by the Government, it would lead to a ridiculous and anomalous position. Thus, where a person is accused of an offence under the Act s. 37 makes the provision for the grant of bail very arduous whereas when a person is convicted, be would not face that much difficulty in getting bail. While interpreting a section, it is elementary that it should be considered in the backdrop of the entire statute and a particular section cannot be read in isolation. S. 32-A interdicts suspension of the sentence and as no differentiation is made with regard to that power to be exercised either by the government or the Court, the argument that the Court is vested with the power to suspend the sentence and the section has no application cannot be sustained.