MOHAMMED ASHRAFF Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question arising in these two Writ Petitions relates to the stage at which, in a similar case in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ), the matter was left open for fresh consideration by the Government on the question of termination and appointment of Government Pleaders on individual basis.

(2.) The following are the facts: OP 10391 of 1991 is filed by M.A. Mohammed Ashraf, Advocate-Government Pleader while OP 10826 of 1991 is filed by Thariyan Joseph, Advocate-Government Pleader. Petitioner in O.P. 10391 of 1991 was appointed as a Government Pleader in the High Court of Kerala under an order of the Government dated 26-3-1991 for a period of three years from the date of assumption of charge. On 1-10-1991 he was served with a notice dated 30-9-1991 issued by the Secretary to the Government, Law Department which after referring to the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') and in particular to R.17 relating to termination, states that the services of the petitioner as Government Pleader have been considered by the Government to be no more necessary for them and that the said service should be terminated immediately. The notice further states that the petitioner is given one month's time in the sense that the appointment shall stand terminated on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of Ext. P2 notice. Questioning the said notice, petitioner filed the present Writ Petition. In O.P. 10826 of 1991, the petitioner Mr. Thariyan Joseph was appointed as Government Pleader in the High Court of Kerala on 26-3-1991 for a period of three years from the date he would assume charge. The petitioner therein assumed charge on 3-4-1991. He too received a notice dated 30-9-1991 which after reciting the provisions of the Rules referred to above and R.17, proceeded to state that service of the petitioner therein was considered by the Government to be no more necessary for them and that it would stand terminated on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the said notice. Petitioner therein, therefore, questioned the above said notice.

(3.) When the first of the Writ petitions came up for consideration before the learned single Judge, the same was referred to a Division Bench. Thereafter, the second Writ Petition, referred to above, was directed to be posted alongwith the first Writ Petition. That is how both the Writ Petitions have come up before us.