SREEKANTAN NAIR Vs. CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Election to the Syndicate of the Kerala University was held in accordance with the provisions relating to election in the year 1980. The last date for filing nomination was 21st May, 1980. The petitioner, who is an Ex-Member of Parliament and respondents 3 and 4 filed their nominations. No objection was raised by the petitioner at the time of scrutiny of nominations. The Members of the Syndicate are elected on the basis of proportional representation by single transferable vote. Respondents 3 and 4 were declared elected in the first round itself since they got the quota of first votes. The petitioner did not get elected. Thereupon he filed an election petition dated 2nd June, 1980 under statute 5(2) of Chap.1 of the First Statutes of the University. I am not adverting to the details not strictly relevant as to the events that took place before the election petition was actually taken up for consideration by the 1st respondent, the Chancellor. The Chancellor heard the election petition after giving due notice to the parties concerned on 30th July, 1980. The challenge against the election of respondents 3 and 4 was based on the third proviso to S.22 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which prevented a person being the Member of the Syndicate for two terms in succession. Respondents 3 and 4 were functioning as the Members of the Syndicate for a period of one year and four months with effect from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 and had continued as Members for four years from February, 1976 on being elected. The petitioner's case was that the election of respondents 3 and 4 in question would enable them to continue as Members of the Syndicate for a third term which was opposed to S.22. The Chancellor in Ext. P-1 order after considering the rival contentions put forward held that respondents 3 and 4 had not been the Members of the Syndicate for two terms in succession coming within the mischief of S.22 of the Act and dismissed the petition. The decision by the Chancellor was grounded on the finding that the expression 'term' used in S.22 of the Act postulated two terms after an election as envisaged in the Act. The period of one year and six months during which respondents 3 and 4 continued in office from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 cannot be brought within the word 'term' used in S.22. It is this order that is under challenge in the Writ Petition.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the University, respondents 3 and 4 and the learned Advocate General in support and against of the contentions raised in the petition. The point at issue falls within a short compass and that relates to interpretation to be given to the third proviso to S.22 of the Act which governs the matter. I read S.22 in full: -

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner forcefully contended that S.22 contained an in-built safeguard preventing Members of the Syndicate from continuing for more than two terms in succession, lest they should establish any vested interest in the Syndicate. A high academic body like the Syndicate should be free from vested interests, from bias and from other extraneous influences. This can best be safeguarded by introducing new blood into the Syndicate and this intendment of the legislature is reflected in the embargo contained in third proviso to S.22 preventing a Member from continuing in the Syndicate for two terms in succession. Viewed against this background, he contended, the word 'term' should not be rigidly construed. To effectuate the intendment of the legislature and to implement the wholesome objects with which S.22 was enacted the word 'term' should be given an interpretation in consonance with the intendment of the legislature and not an interpretation to defeat it. He, therefore, submitted that the terms of office of respondents 3 and 4 from 27th July, 1974 to 5th February, 1976 and four years from February, 1976 after election should be construed as the two terms contemplated under S.22 of the Act. The learned Advocate General and the counsel for the University and respondents 3 and 4 countered this submission with the plea that the term contemplated under S.22 is the term during which a person is a Member of the Syndicate after election held under the Act. According to them, the Chancellor of the University has come to a proper and reasonable conclusion and this court would not normally interfere with that conclusion on inconsequential grounds, for the policy of the court should be to affirm a reasonable conclusion arrived at by the Chancellor and not to interfere with it even if a slightly different conclusion is possible under the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits in reply to this plea that in matters of interpretation of Statutes the court should unhesitatingly step in when the court finds that the interpretation given by the Chancellor is not in conformity with the object and intendment of the legislature. I proceed on the assumption that the petitioner's counsel is justified in the submission that this court should exercise its jurisdiction on being satisfied that the interpretation put by the Chancellor on the relevant provisions of law in question is not in conformity with the intendment of the legislature and does not advance the wholesome object with which the section in question was put on the statute book.