R C MATHEW Vs. K M JOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Can, a Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter, the Act) adjudicate upon a claim for compensation in respect of an accident which arose on 26-5-1976 (i. e. prior to the introduction of Clause (aa) in Section 110-A (1) of the Act) out of the use of a motor vehicle but involving only damages to property and not involving death of or bodily injury to any person? This is the question that falls for decision in this case.

(2.) It is not disputed that under Section 110 of the Act the State Government can constitute one or more Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles, if such accidents involve the death of, or bodily injury to persons or damages to any property of a third party, or both, and that this provision is disjunctive wherefore a Claims Tribunal so constituted has adjudicatory jurisdiction to determine compensation for either or both of (i) the death of or bodily injury to persons and (ii) damages to any property of a third party caused by an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. It is also not disputed that the Kerala State Government has constituted Claims Tribunals in this State in terms of Section 110 of the Act, conferring jurisdiction on them to adjudicate upon claims for compensation for either or both of (i) the death of or bodily injury to persons and (ii) damages to any property of a third party caused by an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.

(3.) The contention is that despite such conferment of jurisdiction as is contemplated by Section 110 of the Act, an application claiming compensation solely for damages to a property of a third party caused by an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle cannot be entertained because Section 110A of the Act (as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 47 of 1978) does not mention that such a person can make an application. One would have thought that a Court or Tribunal invested by a statutory provision with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a certain claim could competently exercise that jurisdiction on such jurisdiction being invoked by any one, who has a cause of action of the nature over which and in respect of which such adjudicatory jurisdiction is conferred on the Court or the Tribunal, no matter whether the statute contains or not another provision which says that such a person can make an application in that behalf. If adjudicatory jurisdiction exists, it needs only to be invoked for its exercise, as otherwise the conferment of that power will not serve any purpose. If there are provisions governing the manner in which such power is to be invoked, certainly, it could be invoked only in that manner. If there be no provi-sion regulating the manner of invoking that power, then it can be invoked in any manner that is in accord with the general practice obtained in relation to invocation of the jurisdiction of the particular Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be.