(1.) Commons Club, Kanjirappally, like many of its ilk had laudable objectives to wit: promotion of fine arts and sports, propagation of knowledge, encouragement of physical and mental activities and the like. Founded in the year 1954, it appears to have a period of inaction for some time. Active functioning was resumed by about 1966. A new set of office-bearers was elected in March, 1969. Soon thereafter there appeared to have arisen some unfortunate dissatisfaction among a section of the members about the manner of functioning of the 1st defendant -Secretary. In the wake of certain allegations, the Secretary resigned from the office on 14 7 1969. That apparently did not abate the already ignited ill feelings against him on the part of the dissident members. This led to the institution of the present suit by one among the members of the Governing Body of the Club. Though the plaintiff could have been described in a better and more accurate form in the plaint, we are of the view that in substance and in effect, it is one instituted by a member of the Club, on behalf of the numerous members of that Club having the same interest. It was averred in the plaint that a final settlement of accounts in respect of the financial transactions during the time the Ist defendant was functioning as the Secretary of the Club was necessary and that a decree should be passed against him. A petition under O.1 R.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed, supported by an affidavit giving the reasons justifying the invocation of the provisions of that Order. This was duly considered by the court and the prayer was ultimately granted. Pursuant to this, publications as envisaged under that Rule were effected.
(2.) Various contentions were raised by the defence. However, having regard to the limited nature of the questions raised in the second appeal, it is unnecessary to refer to all of them. The maintainability of the suit on behalf of the Club was one of the important and fundamental contentions so raised. The exact period for which liability could be fastened on the 1st defendant was another. The latter question arose when the plaintiff contended that the period for which rendition of accounts was to be made by the 1st defendant projected back to a period commencing from 1966 where be was effectively carrying out the functions of the Secretary of the Club, though not eo nomine elected as the Secretary of the Club.
(3.) The Trial Court held that the suit is maintainable, and that pw. 1 who signed the plaint was competent to sue, particularly having regard to the attitude of deliberate recalcitrance shown by the 2nd defendant President and certain other members of the Managing Committee to institute a suit against the 1st defendant. The court also referred to the notice under Order T, R.8 issued with the permission of the court The liability of the 1st defendant for the rendition of accounts was also found to exist, despite his contention to the contrary. The quantification of the liability was relegated to the final decree proceedings. A preliminary decree in terms of Para.37 of its judgment was thus passed by the Trial Court.