A D M STUBBINGS Vs. SHELLAMUTHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revision petitioners are accused in C. C. 66 of 1971 on the file of the First Class Magistrate's Court Devicolam. They represent the Chokkanadu Estate, Kannan Devan Hills. Against them the complaint was preferred by one Shollamuthu under S.500 I P C , alleging that the revision petitioners published defamatory imputations against him intending to harm his reputation. He was dismissed from the service of the Estate as it was reported to the Estate that firewood was stolen by him from the Estate and sold in the market. The dismissal was preceded by an inquiry by the management at which it was found that the charge levelled against the respondent was true. After the dismissal he filed the present complaint before the Magistrate alleging that the imputation of theft made against him was made with the malicious intention of injuring his reputation and lowering him in the eyes of the public and the members of the S.I.P. Union, Munnar of which he was an office bearer. His sworn statement was recorded by the magistrate and process was issued to the accused who are the present revision petitioners. The accused appeared and filed C. M. P. 535 of 1971 praying for a discharge on the ground that the complaint does not prima facie disclose an offence. The learned magistrate having not acceded to the request, they have come up in revision.

(2.) On a review of the position in all relevant aspects, I am definitely of the view that the accused ought to have been discharged, as no case was made against them which if unrebutted, would warrant their conviction. The inquiry was held by the Estate authorities on the misconduct of the complainant. As provided in the Standing Orders governing the Estate, the Industrial Establishment Act, 1946 and the Kerala Industrial Employment Rules, 1958 are applicable to the Estate and they provide for suspension or dismissal of any workman for misconduct. Standing Orders framed under the Rules, have the force of law. The inquiry conducted, was a domestic inquiry into the misconduct of the workman and a charge sheet was issued to him setting forth the acts of misconduct. The workman was given every opportunity for defending himself in the inquiry. Witnesses were examined at the inquiry and they were cross examined by the workman. The result of the inquiry was that he was found guilty of the charges and accordingly he was dismissed. The question for consideration is whether the inquiry and the finding arrived at in the inquiry could furnish the basis of an action for defamation. In my view, no action can be sustained under such circumstances. In Barratt v. Kearns (74 LJ. K. B. Division 318) it was held that an enquiry by a commission of enquiry appointed by the bishop of a diocese under the Pluralities Act, is an enquiry by a judicial tribunal, and words spoken by a witness when giving evidence upon the enquiry, though not upon oath, are absolutely privileged. The action was brought by the plaintiff, a clerk in holy orders and vicar and incumbent of a church and parish in the diocese of Winchester, to recover damages for a slander alleged to have been spoken by the defendant during the course of an enquiry held before an ecclesiastical commission appointed by the bishop of the diocese. So also in the present case, the commission of enquiry instituted under Standing Orders and Rules framed by authority and made applicable to the Estate.

(3.) In Lilley v. Roney and another (7 L. J. -- Q B. Division (892) 727) it was held that a letter of complaint against a solicitor in respect of his professional conduct forwarded to the Registrar of the Incorporated Law Society is a step in a judicial proceeding and will be absolutely privileged. In that case the defendants had made charges against the plaintiff a solicitor, before the Committee of the Incorporated Law Society, as appointed under the Solicitors Act, 1888. The charges were disproved "and the complaint was dismissed as groundless. The committee filed their report to the effect that the plaintiff had not been guilty of any professional misconduct, and he was completely exonerated from all the charges. The plaintiff thereupon brought the action against the defendants for libel contained in their original letter of complaint and in the affidavit. The court held that privilege was attached to the statements made before the committee and that the claim ought to have been for malicious prosecution and not for libel. If the proceedings are shown to have been instituted without reasonable or probable cause be would be entitled to damages.