(1.) The only question in this writ appeal is whether there is excessive delegation in S.3 of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act of 1961. A Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant in limine holding that there was no excessive delegation; and the appeal is against that order.
(2.) The counsel has drawn our attention to a few decisions, all of the Supreme Court. The first decision is the decision in the Liberty Cinema case; and the other decisions are M/s. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1967 SC 1895 ), Ram Bachan Lal v. The State of Bihar ( 1967 (3) SCR 1 ), Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi ( AIR 1968 SC 1232 ) and M/s. Jullundur Rubber Goods manufacturers' Association v. The Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 1589 ). The principles as to what should be the nature of the guidelines have been laid down in these decisions fairly clearly. But, the contention of the counsel is that one of the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema case has not been accepted by Subba Rao J. in Devi Das Gopal Krishnan's case. The counsel has pointed out that Subba Rao J. has not agreed as a general principle that guidance can always be spelt out from the limitation to fix the rate by the extent of the needs of and the expenses required by the delegate to discharge its statutory functions. After the arguments in the case closed, the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabchand Bapalal Modi v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad ( 1971 (1) SCC 823 ) has also been brought to our notice. And we find that this question has been pointedly considered in this decision in Para.19 of the judgment. Shelat J has observed:
(3.) The next argument of the counsel is that the guidelines should be found in the statute itself which delegates the power to the local authority. Though, none of the cases cited before us has had occasion to consider this question, we do not find any substance in this contention; because, as in the case before us, the statute which contains the impugned section confers a power of taxation on local authorities. Evidently, the guidelines as indicated by the Supreme Court in the several decisions cited have to be found in the powers of the particular local authority as constituted by the particular statute. The Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, after providing in S.3 for the levy of the tax and the rates of the tax, goes on to provide for subjects like composition and consolidated payment of tax, admission of persons to entertainments subject to tax, manner of payment of tax, exemptions of certain entertainments from payment of tax, manner of recovery of tax, etc. The guidelines for fixing the rates of the levy under S.3 are not provided for in the Act. But that is no ground for holding that for that reason the section involves excessive delegation of taxing power. If we just look into the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act, we get sufficient guidelines in the provisions of the Act (almost all the guidelines mentioned in the Supreme Court decisions are present in the Act). The Government has power to appoint Executive Officers who are controlled by the Deputy Director and the Director; and the Government has power to appoint a Director, a Deputy Director, etc., who are again controlled by the Government. In the language of the Supreme Court, the Government is acting as a watch - dog watching the activities of the Panchayats. Then there is provision in the Panchayats Act for the constitution of a Panchayat Fund; there is provision for the preparation and sanction of budgets; there is provision for the appointment of auditors; and to cap, the local authorities are elected bodies, the members of which have to go back to the electorate once in five years. In effect and in short, all these provisions reveal effective checks on the activities of the Panchayats; and these are all guidelines mentioned in the several Supreme Court decisions.