C ABOOBACKER Vs. SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE IRIKOOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I do not think that the circumstances disclosed are so extraordinary as to entitle the petitioner to invoke the powers of this Court under Art.226, to direct the police to stop investigation into the criminal complaint filed against the petitioner. The rule, very cautiously and guardedly laid down by the Supreme Court in S. N. Sarma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari ( AIR 1970 SC 786 ) is not attracted; and I decline interference, not on account of any absence of power, but because the case is not an appropriate one, within the meaning of the rule, to compel interference.

(2.) True, that the petitioner may count in his favour the fact that on three prior occasions, three successive criminal complaints filed against him by the same complainant resulted in orders of acquittal in C. C. Nos. 104, 105 & 106/1968 respectively, on the file of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Tellicherry (C. C. No. 105/1968 was transferred to the file of the District Magistrate, Tellicherry and disposed of as C. C. 229/1968). But I have no reason to expect that the police would not pay heed to these judgments of the criminal courts, (none of which was produced, although one was read at the hearing), before proceeding or deciding to investigate into the fourth complaint, investigation into which is now sought to be prevented. The counter affidavit filed in this case discloses that the complaints on the earlier occasions, and the complaint on the present occasion, all proceed on the basis of separate and independent acts of trespass committed by the petitioner. It is said that the trespass which led to C.C. No 105/1953 was on 2-12-1967, that the trespass which led to C.C. 107/1968 was on 11-12-1967 and that the complaint now under investigation and registered as Crime No. 32 of 1969 at the Irikoor Police Station, is based on a trespass committed on 3-4-1969. The petitioner's Counsel would have it that, if at all, there was only one act of criminal trespass on the earliest occasion, and that the further unlawful continuance in possession by the petitioner after the first criminal trespass, if any, would not render the petitioner guilty of criminal trespass for such continuance. For this purpose he placed reliance on the decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Yohannan Isreal v. Poulose Pathrose and Others (1971 Madras Law Journal (Criminal) p. 56). Here again, I do not see bow this is a ground to direct the police to stop the investigation. I have no reason to believe that they will not take either the facts or the law into account before deciding or pursuing investigation. And if, despite their advertence to these, the petitioner is till hauled up for trial, he may well urge all his grievances before the Court. It was laid down by the Privy Council as early as 1945 in the well known Nazir Ahmed's case ( AIR 1945 PC 18 ), that the judiciary should not interfere with police investigation, and the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not till then; and the principle was affirmed in State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak ( AIR 1963 SC 447 ). While the normal rule is this, and the exception has been pointed out in S. N. Sarmas's case (AIR 1970 SC 786), I am not satisfied that this case falls within the exception and outside the normal rule.

(3.) I dismiss this writ petition, but make no order as to costs.