(1.) This second appeal at the instance of the decree holder stems from an application under O.21, R.2, Civil Procedure Code, made by the judgment debtor to record full satisfaction of the decree passed against him. The decree itself was one for arrears of rent and also for removal of certain kuzhikkoors planted in Item 1 of the plaint schedule by the defendant. The judgment debtor, it appears, wanted to file an appeal, but instead he avers that the parties came to an agreement, Ext. A3, pursuant to which he applied for the recording of the adjustment of the decree. The terms of Ext. A3 were so construed by the decree holder as to furnish a defence for him against the certification of the adjustment. The courts below recorded part satisfaction of the decree on the strength of Ext. A3 and dissatisfied with the order, the decree holder has come up in second appeal contending that Ext. A3 did not actually amount to an adjustment of the decree, but envisaged such adjustment on the fulfilment of certain conditions which remain yet to be fulfilled. Thus, the sole question that falls for decision is as to whether Ext. A3 operates as an adjustment of the decree in part or only contemplates such adjustment on the performance of certain conditions.
(2.) The law on the point is clear and does not admit of any contrary lines of thought. Counsel on both sides have cited various rulings and I see no divergence in the ratio contained in these decisions. In Udham Singh v. Atma Singh, AIR 1941 Lah. 149 (FB) a Full Bench of that court took the view that a completed contract which immediately extinguishes the decree operates as an adjustment within the meaning of O.21 R.2, Civil Procedure Code, but if there is only an agreement to adjust the decree on the fulfilment of a future condition and the decree is still left in existence pending the fulfilment of the condition, then there is no adjustment. Their Lordships emphasised that the question really turns on the intention to extinguish the decree in praesenti. In Gulam Mohamed v. Narendranath, AIR 1963 Mad. 261 a Division Bench of that court stated the same proposition in different words. The particular agreement which their Lordships dealt with stated that in case the parties did not comply with the conditions stipulated there, the decree would be executable. Obviously, that agreement did not immediately extinguish the decree, but did so only on the fulfilment of a condition. The court, therefore, directed the Subordinate Judge to ascertain whether the condition had been fulfilled and whether the decretal liability had thereby been extinguished.
(3.) Act I of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 produced the perplexing consequence of both sides not being able to state clearly what their stand should be in regard to the implementation of Ext. A3 in the light of the various provisions of the Land Reforms Act. Anyway, I am concerned with the subject matter of the appeal only and while I dismiss the appeal. I make it clear that nothing stated here affects the rights of the parties under Act 1 of 1964 if they have any. The parties will bear their costs in this appeal which I hereby dismiss.