PARAMESWARAN ALIAS PARAMU Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE accused-appellant has been convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and sentence a under S. 304 Part II IPC. to rigorous Imprisonment for seven years. THE charge against him is that on 18 1-1-1970 at about 9. 30 p. m. he stabbed one Chakkunni with a knife identified as m. O. 2 in the case, on his chest of which he died a few hours thereafter pw 1 is the son of Chakkunni. Earlier in the day while pw1 was returning from the bazar the accused stopped him and tried to stab him. As the accused was trying to take the knife from under the fold of his cloth pw. 1 ran away. He reported the matter to his father Chakkunni. At about 9 p. m. the father went over to the accused's father. THE latter was at the time lying on a cot in a room in the house. Chakkunni went near him, and sitting on the door step, narrated the earlier incident in the course of which he administered the warning to the accused's father that unless he bestows sufficient attention on his children, they would go astray after his death. At the nick of the time the accused appeared there with the knife, dealt a stab on Chakkunni, and escaped from there. Chakkunni was taken to the hospital, but on the way be died. THE accused, it appears, harboured ill-will against Chakkunni and bis son, as he suspected that they bad illicit association with his sister who was staying with the father. Accused was staying away with his wife.

(2.) IN the committal court no plea was put forward by the accused. Except denying the charge nothing else was stated by him. But in the sessions Court when questioned under S. 342 he stated that when he was just entering the house Chakkunni attacked him with a knife. He caught hold of the knife, and in the scuffle that followed Chakkuni sustained an injury. He also sustained injuries. Somehow, he escaped from the clutches of Chakkunni, and ran home. Learned Sessions Judge believing mainly on the evidence of the accused's father and sister, has entered the conviction. Learned Judge however, has found that the accused had not the intention to cause the death of Chakkunni. But be must be presumed to have the knowledge that the injury inflicted, was likely to cause the death of the victim. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence have been entered under S. 304 Part II IPC. Chakkunni, as is seen from the post-mortem certificate, bad sustained an injury 21/2" X 1" on the centre of his chest, extending from the centre of the sternum and reaching the level of the nipple. The accused seems to have sustained two abrasions, one on the right wrist and the other on the left leg with some swelling on the left ankle. He was arrested the next day and produced before the Medical Officer, pw. 10. He seems to have stated that the abrasions and swelling were caused by a fall while running. His plea of self-defence in the circumstances, has to be discredited. It has also to be noted that the plea of self-defence was put forward by him only in the sessions Court. If it were a genuine plea, he should normally have put forward the same before the committing magistrate when opportunity was first given. IN the circumstances, it is possible to argue that this belated plea came to him only as an after-thought.

(3.) THESE observations with which I am in respectful agreement, are on all fours in the present case also. The right and opportunity was there, but the accused did not avail himself of it. Ex. P11 is the deposition given by the father before the committing magistrate. Therein he has given a clear picture of the incident. He has stated that Chakkunni came and sat by the side of the cot on which he was lying and while Chakkunni was talking to him, the accused came all on a sudden, dealt the stab and ran away. This is corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of pw. 2, the accused's sister who was staying in the house along with the father. Commenting on the evidence of pw. 2 learned counsel pointed out that there are discrepancies in her evidence. One discrepancy pointed out is that according to her when Chakkunni came, the door was opened by her while according to the father in Ex P-11 the door was opened by him. This appears to be a discrepancy, but I do not think, it is material to shake the prosecution evidence. Another statement particularly pointed out by the learned counsel is that he was not able to say what all transpired in the house during the time. I do dot think, what she meant was that she did not see the stabbing. The stabbing was already spoken to by her. So, the reference to what all transpired in the house cannot include the stabbing. Learned counsel has no point to suggest why the father and the sister are giving such evidence against the accused if in fact, the occurrence was not seen by them. It has not come in the evidence that they are ill-disposed to him. The recovery of the weapon was also commented upon by the learned counsel. According to him, the recovery cannot be accepted for any purpose, as the weapon was recovered from the roof of a building where according to the evidence the tappers of the locality are keeping their tapping knives. The investigating officer when questioned no doubt stated that the tappers used to keep their knives there. But at the time of the recovery no other knife was seen there. The knife was concealed there and it was recovered in pursuance of the information supplied by the accused himself. From the chemical analyst's report it is seen that there were stains of human blood on the blade of the knife. It is significant that the accused escaped from the scene with the knife and kept it concealed in that state in the roof of the house. On these facts I think, the court below has come to the correct conclusion that the injury on Chakkunni was inflicted by the accused and none else. I do not see any reason to interfere with the sentence also. The conviction and sentence are hence confirmed, and this appeal is dismissed. . .